

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.)

- AGAINST -)

ARAKI, SADAQ, et al.)

A F F I D A V I T

I, Joseph W. Ballantine, having been duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

I entered the Foreign Service of the United States in June 1909, and thereafter served continuously up to date at various diplomatic and consular posts and in the Department of State. From 1909 until 1928 I served continuously either at the American Embassy at Tokyo or in consular posts in the Japanese Empire. From 1928 to 1930 I served in the Department of State. From 1930 to 1934 I served as Consul General at Canton, China; from 1934 to 1936 I served as Consul General at Mukden, Manchuria; from July to December 1936 I served temporarily at the American Embassy in Tokyo as First Secretary; and from March 1937 to date I have served continuously in the Department of State. Up to September 20, 1945 I was on duty in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the Department of State. Between December 1944 and September 1945 I was Director of that office. Since September 1945 my position has been that of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

The matters herein deposed to are mainly within my personal knowledge, otherwise they are matters with which I am familiar from records of the Department of State.

During practically all of my career in the foreign service, I have dealt with Far Eastern Affairs and have followed closely the course of Japanese-American relations. Up until 1931 the relations between the United States and Japan were generally friendly and the American Government and people consistently had an attitude of good will toward the government and people of Japan. The Japanese occupation of Manchuria caused an impairment of those relations.

It is essential to an understanding of the true significance of the conversations which took place in 1941 between the representatives of the Japanese and American Governments looking to a peaceful settlement of the Pacific question to have clearly in mind the background of the political situation in and relating to the Far East.

Almost from the outset of Japan's emergence as a modern state she had been pursuing a policy of military aggrandisement. For the most part, except during certain brief periods when forces of moderation appeared to be in the ascendancy, the intervals between one aggressive step and the next were but periods of consolidation.

In 1895, following Japan's successful war against China, Japan annexed Formosa and tried unsuccessfully to establish a foothold in Manchuria.

In 1905, after the Russo-Japanese war, Japan established herself securely in Manchuria by acquiring a lease of the Kwantung territory and ownership of the South Manchuria Railway. At that time Japan also acquired southern Sakhalin.

In 1928, following the advent of the Tanaka cabinet in 1927, Japan adopted a so-called "positive" policy toward China under which it manifested an increasing disposition to intervene in China's internal affairs.

In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria and subsequently established there a puppet regime under the name of "Manchukuo." By that action, which was a flagrant violation of the Nine Power Treaty, Japan broke completely away from the policy of cooperation agreed upon in the Washington Conference treaties.

The opposition of the American Government to Japan's course was reflected in the identic notes which the United States Government delivered to the Japanese and the Chinese Governments, dated January 7, 1932, stating that the United States could not admit the legality of any situation de facto; that it did not intend to recognize any treaty or agreement between China and Japan which might impair U. S. treaty rights, including those relating to Chinese sovereignty and the open door policy; and that it did not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement brought about contrary to the Kellogg Pact.

Although the United States was not a member of the League of Nations, it cooperated with the League in relation to the Manchurian question.

In a note addressed to the Secretary of State dated February 21, 1934, Mr. Hirota, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated that he believed that no question existed between the United States and Japan "that is fundamentally incapable of amicable solution." The Secretary of State in his reply expressed concurrence in that view and emphasized the belief of the American Government in adjustments of questions by pacific means. The exchange of messages in question is quoted on pp. 127 - 129 inclusive, Foreign Relations of the United States - Japan, 1931-1941, Volume I.

Nevertheless, on April 17, 1934, the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman gave out a truculent official statement known as the "Amau" statement. In that statement, Japan made clear a purpose to compel China to follow Japan's dictate and to permit other countries to have relations with China only as Japan allowed. A copy of that statement is annexed as Exhibit A.

On December 29, 1934, while Hirota was still Foreign Minister, Japan gave formal notice of its intention to withdraw at the end of 1936 from the Naval Limitation Treaty signed at Washington on February 6, 1922. Following the giving of that notice, Japan proceeded energetically to increase her armaments, preparatory to launching her invasion in China.

In July 1937, with Hirota again Foreign Minister, Japan deliberately took advantage of a minor incident between Chinese and Japanese forces at a point near Peiping and began flagrantly to invade China on a huge scale. She poured into China immense armies which spread fan-like over great areas, including industrial and other key centers. These armies raped, robbed, murdered and committed all kinds of lawless acts. Particularly barbarous were the outrages in Nanking following occupation of that city by Japanese military on December 13, 1937. Public opinion in the United States was shocked by these outrages.

Subsequent to the renewed Japanese armed attack on China, beginning on July 7, 1937, relations between the United States and Japan steadily deteriorated. The Japanese military forces completely disregarded in their acts suggestions made by the United States and other governments that reasonable consideration be given by them to the safety, rights and interests of nationals of third countries in China. American public opinion became outraged by the methods and strategy employed by the Japanese military and became gradually more and more critical of Japan. The United States Government looked with thorough disfavor upon the current manifestations of Japanese foreign policy and upon the methods employed by the Japanese military in pursuit of their policy.

On August 10, 1937, the United States made an offer of American good offices in the dispute between Japan and China, but the attitude of the Japanese Government was such that nothing came of it.

On October 6, 1937, the American Government protested that the action of Japan in China was inconsistent with the principles which should govern relationships between nations and was contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and of the Briand-Kellogg Pact.

In November 1937 the United States participated with eighteen other nations in a conference held at Brussels to "study peaceable means of hastening the end of the regrettable conflict which prevails" in the Far East. The conference was held in accordance with a provision of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922. The repeated refusals of the Japanese Government to participate in the conference effectively prevented efforts to bring about an end to the conflict by mediation and conciliation. On November 24 the conference suspended its sittings.

On December 12, 1937, Japanese aircraft bombed and sank the U.S.S. Panay in the Yangtze River.

To gain public support in Japan for its program of military expansion, slogans were used, such as "the new order in Greater East Asia" and "the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." The United States and other countries were charged with attempting to choke Japan's development. That charge was entirely unfounded except as it applied to American and British opposition to Japan's courses of aggression.

On July 26, 1939, the Government of the United States notified the Japanese Government of its intention to terminate the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911. It was felt that this treaty was not affording adequate protection to American commerce either in Japan or in Japanese occupied portions of China, while at the same time the operation of the most-favored-nation clause of the treaty was a bar to the adoption of retaliatory measures against Japanese commerce. The treaty therefore terminated on January 26, 1940.

During the entire period of the undeclared war between Japan and China there was on the part of the Japanese Government and the Japanese authorities in China flagrant disregard for and violation of American rights and interests and the jeopardizing of American lives. American property was invaded, occupied, and taken over by the Japanese military authorities. In many instances American property was bombed and American citizens placed in jeopardy of their lives. Discriminatory restrictions were placed upon American enterprise and trade in China. Japanese conscription of and interference with American mail and telegrams and restrictions upon freedom of trade, residence and travel by Americans subjected American interests to continuing serious inconveniences and hardships. Notwithstanding repeated representations and protests by the American Government and notwithstanding repeated and categorical assurances by the Japanese Government that equality of opportunity or the Open Door in China would be maintained and that American rights would be respected, violations of American rights and interests continued.

The imposition by the Japanese authorities of restrictions upon the movement and activities of Americans in China operated to place Japanese interests in a preferred position in China and was discriminatory in its effect upon legitimate American interests. The imposition by the Japanese authorities of exchange controls, compulsory currency circulation, tariff revision and monopolistic promotion implied an assumption on the part of the Japanese authorities that the Japanese Government or the regimes established and maintained in China by Japanese armed forces were entitled to act in China in a capacity such as flows from rights of sovereignty and to disregard the established rights and interests of other countries, including the United States.

The Japanese Prime Minister, in a public statement November 3, 1938, said in part: "All countries of the world should have a clear recognition regarding the new situation in the Far East. History shows clearly that peace and independence in China have been frequently menaced as the result of the struggle for supremacy among foreign Powers which was based on imperialistic ambitions. Japan sees the necessity of effecting a fundamental revision in this situation and desires to establish a new peace fabric in Far East on the basis of justice. It goes without saying that Japan will not exclude cooperation of foreign Powers. Neither she intends to damage the legitimate rights of the third Powers in China. If the Powers understand the real intentions of Japan and devise a policy in accordance with the new situation in the Far East, Japan does not grudge to cooperate with them for peace in the Far East." He did not, however, define what he meant by policies "in accordance with the new situation in the Far East." (U. S. Foreign Relations - Japan - 1931-1941, Vol. II, page 480.)

In September 1939 the Government of the United States protested to the Japanese Government against a large-scale propaganda campaign against Western nations, including the United States, undertaken by Japanese agencies in areas of China under Japanese control. In pronouncements and manifestos issued by puppet regimes at Peiping and Nanking it was sought to persuade Chinese people that the difficulties and burdens which the hostilities had brought upon the native population should be blamed upon the Western nations, including the United States. Strong anti-American feeling was fostered in various places, anti-American parades were organized, and anti-American banners and posters were displayed.

In August and September 1940 it came to the knowledge of the Department of State that Japan had concluded an agreement with Vichy France under which Japanese troops moved into northern Indo-China. The Acting Secretary of State on September 20, 1940, informed the Japanese Ambassador that the Ambassador himself could be under no misapprehension as to the very serious disquiet and very open opposition which the action threatened by Japan in Indo-China would create in the minds of the members of the United States Government and on the part of public opinion generally in the United States.

In September 1940, Japan entered into the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. In the view of the Government of the United States that alliance was aimed directly at the United States. It was designed to discourage the United States from taking adequate measures of self-defense until both Japan and Germany had completed their program of conquest in Asia and Europe, when they could turn on the United States then standing alone. The Secretary of State in commenting on September 30, 1940, to the British Ambassador on the subject of that alliance observed that the relations among Germany, Italy and Japan, each having a common objective of conquering certain areas of the world and each pursuing identical policies of force, devastation, and seizure, had been during recent years on the "basis of complete understanding and of mutual cooperation" for all practical purposes.

After the autumn of 1940 it became clearly apparent that the Japanese military leaders had embarked upon a program for the conquest of the entire Far East and Western Pacific area. That program was referred to by euphemistic slogans such as the "New Order in Greater East Asia" and "the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." They went out with force and entered into collaboration with Hitler to establish a new world order, arrogating to themselves a sphere which embraced an area occupied by nearly half of the population of the world.

During all these years the Government of the United States consistently sought to remind the Japanese Government of the traditional friendship and mutually profitable relations between the two countries and to keep before the Japanese Government in the most tactful manner possible the principles which should form the basis of worthwhile relationships between nations. The Government of the United States also sought to dissuade Japan from her courses by pointing the way to just and honorable alternatives which would have assured Japan what she professed to seek - national security and economic prosperity.

It was also necessary to bear in mind in entering upon the conversations with the Japanese in 1941, Japan's long record of duplicity in international dealings.

In 1904, Japan guaranteed Korea's independence and territorial integrity. In 1910, Japan annexed Korea.

In 1908, Japan pledged with the United States to support the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity there. In 1915, Japan presented to China the notorious "twenty-one demands."

In 1918, Japan entered into an inter-allied arrangement whereby forces, not exceeding above 7,000 by any one power, were to be sent to Siberia to guard military stores which might be subsequently needed by Russian forces, to help the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense, and to aid the evacuating Czechoslovakian forces in Siberia. The Japanese military saw in this enterprise an opportunity in which they were eventually unsuccessful, to annex eastern Siberia and sent more than 70,000 troops.

In the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922, Japan agreed to respect China's sovereignty, independence and territorial and administrative integrity. Japan also agreed to use its influence to establish the principle of equal opportunity there. Japan's whole course in China since 1931 of military occupation and economic domination was in violation of those pledges.

On November 21, 1932, Mr. Matsuoka, then Japanese delegate to the League of Nations, said: "We want no more territory." By the end of 1932 Japanese forces had occupied the whole of Manchuria, and in subsequent years they moved southward and westward occupying a vast area of China.

On July 27, 1937, Prince Konoye, then Japanese Premier, said: "In sending troops to North China, of course, the Government has no other purpose, as was explained in its recent statement, than to preserve the peace of East Asia." In order to "preserve the peace of East Asia," Japanese forces for four years had carried warfare and suffering over the greater part of China.

On October 28, 1937, the Japanese Foreign Office said, "Japan never looks upon the Chinese people as an enemy . . ." Japan showed its friendly feeling for China by bombing Chinese civilian populations, by burning Chinese cities, by making millions of Chinese homeless and destitute, by mistreating and killing civilians, and by acts of horror and cruelty.

On April 15, 1940, Mr. Arita, then Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, said the "Japanese Government cannot but be deeply concerned over any development . . . that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies." Following the occupation of the Netherlands by Germany that spring, Japan sent a Commercial Commission to the Indies which asked concessions so far reaching that, if granted, they would have reduced the Indies practically to a Japanese colony.

After the renewal of Japan's undeclared war against China in July 1937, Japanese civilian leaders time and again gave assurances that American rights would be respected. Time and again the Japanese military acted in violation of those assurances.

Time and again the Japanese gave assurances that American lives and property in China would be respected. Yet there were reported in steadily mounting numbers cases of bombing of American property with consequent loss or endangering of American lives.

Time and again, the Japanese gave assurances that American treaty rights in China would be respected. Unnumbered measures infringing those rights were put into effect in Japanese occupied

areas. Trade monopolies were set up, discriminatory taxes were imposed, American properties were occupied, and so on. In addition, American nationals were assaulted, arbitrarily detained, and subjected to indignities.

In 1931-1933, while Japan was carrying forward its program of aggression, the American Government was moving steadily ahead in advocacy of world support of sanctity of treaties and peaceful processes.

On May 16, 1934, the Secretary of State had a general conversation with Japanese Ambassador Saito, one of many conversations in which he endeavored to convince the Japanese that their best interests lay in following policies of peace.

Three days later, the Secretary of State talked again with the Japanese Ambassador. During the conversation, the Ambassador repeated the formula which his Government had been putting forward publicly for some weeks to the effect that Japan had a superior and special function in connection with the preservation of peace in Eastern Asia. The Secretary of State brought to the Japanese Ambassador's attention the clear implications contained in the Japanese formula of the intention on the part of Japan to exercise an overlordship over neighboring nations and territories.

During the winter of 1940 and the spring of 1941, it was apparent that the Japanese military leaders were starting on a mission of conquest of the entire Pacific area west of a few hundred miles of Hawaii and extending to the South Seas and to India. The Japanese were out with force in collaboration with Hitler to establish a new world order, and they thought they had the power to compel all peaceful nations to come in under that new order in the half of the world they had arrogated to themselves.

In March 1941, just as I was about to proceed to China to assume the post of Counselor of Embassy there, I was instructed by the Secretary of State to remain in Washington for consultation in connection with a suggestion which had been informally brought to the attention of the President and the Secretary of State through the medium of private Americans and Japanese that the Japanese Government would welcome an opportunity to alter its political alignments and modify its attitude toward China. It was represented that if an agreement could be achieved with the U. S. which would offer Japan security, this would enable the moderate elements in Japan to gain control of the domestic political situation there. It was further represented that there was adequate support in the Japanese Government for an agreement with the U. S. which would provide, among other things, for practical nullification of Japan's alliance with the Axis and for settlement of the conflict between China and Japan on terms which would give complete recognition by Japan of the "open door" in China, provided that Japan received similar treatment elsewhere in the Far East. It was also represented that the Japanese people were weary of the hostilities with China and that most elements in Japan were prepared for a recasting of Japan's policies along liberal and peaceful lines.

Welcoming these suggestions, but also with the history as above summarized in mind, the President and the Secretary of State during March and April, 1941, several times discussed with the Japanese Ambassador the subject of effecting an improvement in the relations between the United States and Japan.

On May 12, the Japanese Ambassador presented as under instructions a proposal for a general settlement between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. A copy of that document is annexed as Exhibit B. The terms which Japan intended to propose to China were indicated only through reference to the "Konoye principles." Inasmuch as the "Konoye principles" had been made the basis of a so-called treaty between Japan and the Wang Ching-Wei Regime in November 1940, which had placed Japan in a position of overlordship with respect to the Wang Regime, the Secretary of State sought to induce the Japanese to state precisely the terms which they had in mind as a basis of Japan's negotiations with China, but the Japanese Ambassador and his associates constantly avoided making definite commitments by constant resort to vague generalities. In the course of conversations with me and with other officers of the Department, Colonel Hideo Iwakuro, the Special Military Adviser of the Japanese Ambassador, explained that the areas where stationing of Japanese troops in China was contemplated under a provision for "defense against Communist activities through collaboration of the two countries /China and Japan/" included Inner Mongolia and the adjacent regions of China proper, comprehending a line of communication to the sea as far south as Tsingtao which thus meant Japanese military domination of the five northern provinces of Hopei, Shantung, Shansi, Chahar, and Suiyuan, with an aggregate area of more than 400,000 square miles and an estimated population of more than 80,000,000. This territory was in addition to Manchuria and the province of Jehol which Japan had brought under her control some years earlier. The Military Adviser declared to me that this stationing of Japanese troops in China was an absolute condition of any settlement with China.

Notwithstanding the various objectionable features of the Japanese Government's proposal, in view of the world situation the Government of the U. S. decided to explore thoroughly every possible means, starting with the Japanese proposals, of coming to an agreement. The Secretary of State on numerous occasions at which I was present emphasized to the Japanese Ambassador that this Government was aware of the difficult internal situation which the Japanese Government faced and was prepared to be patient and to give the Japanese Government ample time to bring Japanese public opinion into line in support of a liberal broad-gauge program, such as the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador had been discussing in their conversations. The Japanese representatives expressed surprise that this Government should raise with them the points in regard to the terms of settlement which Japan proposed with China as they regarded the settlement of the China affair as a matter which concerned only China and Japan. The Secretary of State pointed out in numerous conversations that a peaceful settlement between Japan and China was an essential element in furthering the objective which the U. S. and Japan had in mind, namely, the peace of the Pacific, and that if the U. S. should, as the Japanese

proposed, suggest that China enter negotiations with Japan, this Government could not divest itself of a certain degree of responsibility with regard to the basis of the proposed negotiations and the general conformity of Japan's proposed terms with the principles which this Government supports. On May 29, in response to questions asked by the Secretary of State, the Japanese Ambassador indicated that withdrawal of the Japanese troops from China following a settlement with China, would not include Japanese troops retained in China for "cooperative defense against Communism," and that he was unable to state how many troops Japan would propose retaining or to define the precise areas in which those troops would be stationed. The Japanese Ambassador, in reply to further questions by the Secretary of State, said that he did not believe that the Far East had progressed to a point where other arrangements would be feasible. The Secretary of State also, on May 28, made it clear that the Japanese proposed formula with reference to Japan's relations to the Axis did not adequately clarify Japan's peaceful intention toward the U. S., should the U. S. through acts of self-defense become involved in war with Germany. He emphasized that such clarification was needed, especially to off-set statements being made by Japanese officials in justification of Japan's Axis obligations and that if we made an agreement with Japan, critics would, unless the Japanese Government had adequately clarified its attitude on this point, assert that there was no assurance as to Japan's position vis a vis the U. S.

The question of what Japan meant by "economic cooperation" between China and Japan was also discussed. As the informal conversations proceeded, it was evident that Japan intended to retain a preferred economic position for herself in China, while at the same time trying to obtain for herself in the southwestern Pacific area economic rights such as it was unwilling that a third Power should enjoy in China. The Secretary of State made it clear that retention by Japan of a preferred position in China would be inconsistent with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations to which this Government was committed, which it believed to be essential for a lasting peace in the Pacific, and which the Japanese had said they approved.

On June 6, the Secretary of State informed the Japanese Ambassador that he had received the impression, from the successive Japanese revisions of their proposal and from recent manifestations of the Japanese Government's attitude, that the Japanese Government was disposed (1) to stress Japanese alignment with the Axis; (2) to avoid giving a clear indication of an intention to place Japan's relations with China on a basis which would contribute to a lasting peace in the Far East; and (3) to veer away from clear-cut commitments in regard to policies of peace and of non-discriminatory treatment which were the fundamentals of a sound basis for peace in the Pacific.

The Japanese pressed for a complete reply to their proposals of May 12. Accordingly, on June 21, the Ambassador was given the American Government's view in the form of a tentative redraft of their proposals. A copy of that document is appended as Exhibit C. There is annexed as Exhibit D a comparison in parallel columns between such provisions of the Japanese proposal of May 12 and the American counterdraft of June 21, as represented material and essential differences.

On June 22, Germany attacked the Soviet Union, and in July the American Government began receiving reports that a large Japanese military movement into southern Indo-China was imminent. This Japanese movement threatened the Philippine Islands and British and Dutch possessions in the western Pacific area. It also threatened vital trade routes. Officers of the Department of State immediately brought these reports to the attention of the Japanese Ambassador, pointed out the inconsistency between such a military movement and the conversations which were then proceeding, and requested information as to the facts. On July 23, the Japanese Ambassador stated in explanation that Japan needed to secure an uninterrupted source of supplies and to insure against encirclement of Japan militarily. The Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, replied that the agreement, which was being discussed between American and Japanese representatives, would give Japan far greater economic security than she could gain by occupying Indo-China. He pointed out that the United States policy was the opposite of an encirclement policy. He said that the United States could only regard the action of Japan as constituting notice that Japan was taking the last step to proceeding on a policy of expansion and conquest in the region of the South Seas. He told the Ambassador, under instructions from the Secretary of State, that under those circumstances, the Secretary could not see any basis for pursuing further the conversations with the Japanese Ambassador.

On July 24 President Roosevelt made a proposal to the Japanese Government that Indo-China be regarded as a "neutralized" country. That proposal envisaged Japan's being given the fullest and freest opportunity of assuring for herself a source of food supplies and other raw materials which--according to Japanese accounts--Japan was seeking to obtain. The Japanese Government did not accept the President's proposal, and large Japanese forces were moved into Southern Indo-China.

The Japanese move into southern Indo-China was an aggravated, overt act. It created a situation in which the risk of war became so great that the United States and other countries concerned were confronted no longer with the question of avoiding such risk but from then on with the problem of preventing a complete undermining of their security. It was essential that the United States make a definite and clear move in self-defense.

Accordingly, on July 26, 1941, President Roosevelt issued an executive order freezing Chinese and Japanese assets in the United States. That order brought under the control of the Government all financial and import and export trade transactions in which Chinese or Japanese interests were involved. The British and Netherlands Governments took similar steps. The effect of this was to bring about very soon virtual cessation of trade between the United States and Japan.

Thereafter, on August 8, the Japanese Ambassador inquired whether it might not be possible for the responsible heads of the two governments to meet with a view to discussing means for reaching an adjustment of views. After reviewing briefly the steps which had led to a discontinuance of the informal conversations, the Secretary of State said it remained to the Japanese Government to decide whether it could find means of shaping its policies along lines which would make possible an adjustment of views.

On August 28 the President was given a message from the Japanese Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, urging that a meeting of the heads of the two Governments be arranged to discuss all important problems by Japan and the United States covering the entire Pacific area. Accompanying that message was a statement containing assurances, with several qualifications, of Japan's peaceful intent. Copies of the message and accompanying statement are annexed as Exhibit E.

The President in his reply given on September 3 suggested that there take place immediately in advance of the proposed meeting preliminary discussions on fundamental and essential questions on which agreement was sought and on the manner in which the agreement would be applied. A copy of this reply is annexed as Exhibit F.

It was felt by the American Government that the President could go to such a meeting only if there were first obtained tentative commitment offering some assurance that the meeting could accomplish good. Neither Prince Konoye nor any of Japan's spokesmen provided anything tangible. They held on to the threat against the United States implicit in the Tripartite Alliance. They would not state that Japan would refrain from attacking the United States if it became involved through acts of self-defense in the European War. The Japanese had already refused to agree to any preliminary steps toward reverting to peaceful courses, as for example adopting the President's proposal of July 24 regarding the neutralization of Indo-China. Instead they steadily moved on with their program of establishing themselves more firmly in Indo-China. They would not budge from their insistence in any peace agreement with China upon terms based on principles which were embodied in a so-called treaty of 1940 with the puppet Wang Ching-wei regime at Nanking and which included the stationing for an indefinite period of large bodies of Japanese troops in wide areas of China and the control by Japan of strategic industries and economic facilities in China--terms which would have given Japan a permanent stranglehold over China. Inasmuch as months of closeup conversations with the Japanese had failed to move them on these points, it would have been illusory to expect that a meeting between the President and the Prime Minister would have resulted in Japan's giving dependable pledges such as would have assured a peaceful settlement. It was clear that unless the proposed meeting produced concrete and clear-cut commitments toward peace, the Japanese would have distorted the significance of such a meeting in such a way as to have a discouraging effect upon the Chinese; if it had resulted merely in endorsing general principles, the Japanese in the light of their past practice could have been expected to utilize such general principles in support of any interpretation which Japan might choose to place upon them; and if it did not produce an agreement, the Japanese leaders would have been in position to declare that the United States was responsible for the failure of the meeting.

On September 6 the Japanese Ambassador presented a new draft of proposals. These proposals were much narrower than the assurances given in the statement communicated to the President on August 28. A copy of this proposal is annexed as Exhibit G.

On September 25, the Japanese Government presented to Ambassador Grew a complete new draft of the Japanese proposals and urged that an early reply be made. The new redraft did not indicate any modification of the attitude of the Japanese Government on fundamental

points. A copy of this proposal is annexed as Exhibit H. The Japanese Government had separately on September 22 communicated to Ambassador Grew a statement in regard to the terms of peace which it proposed to offer China. A copy of that statement is annexed as Exhibit I.

On October 2, the Secretary of State gave to the Japanese Ambassador a memorandum of an "oral statement" reviewing significant developments in the conversations and explaining this Government's attitude toward various points in the Japanese proposals which did not appear to this Government to be consistent with the principles to which the United States was committed. A copy of that "oral statement" is annexed as Exhibit J.

The Japanese, soon after receiving this Government's memorandum of October 2, redoubled their emphasis upon the need of haste in reaching an agreement. They offered new formulas for dealing with limited and specific problems, and they stated that Japan had now placed all of its cards on the table and they had gone as far as they could in the direction of making so-called "concessions." In their new formulas, there was not discernible any evidence that the Japanese Government was moving even one step toward committing itself to courses of peace and that it contemplated receding even one step from insistence upon full attainment of its declared objectives--which were, in effect, political, economic, and cultural domination of the entire western Pacific area and China. After the new Japanese Cabinet, headed by General Tojo, came into office on October 17, the Japanese became even more insistent in urging upon this Government a quick decision on the Japanese Government's proposals, but, while pressing this Government for a decision, the Japanese Government showed no willingness to effect any fundamental modification of the Japanese position and no desire to apply practically in actual situations the basic principles of justice and equity essential to the building of a lasting peace in the Pacific.

Although throughout the conversations with the Japanese representative, the Secretary of State repeatedly made it clear that the American Government would consult with the Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia, China and the Netherlands before entering into actual negotiations with the Japanese Government affecting the interests of those governments, at no time did the Secretary of State make any statement to Japanese representative which would have warranted the Japanese in assuming that in the informal conversations the Secretary of State was delegated to speak or act for the other powers mentioned.

On November 15, Mr. Saburo Kurusu, whom the Japanese Government had decided to send to assist the Japanese Ambassador in the conversations, reached Washington. Shortly thereafter, on November 20, the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu presented to the Secretary of State a proposal which, on its face, was extreme. A copy of that proposal is annexed as Exhibit K.

Before and after presenting that proposal, Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu talked emphatically about the urgency of the situation and intimated vigorously that this was Japan's last word and if an agreement along those lines was not quickly concluded startling developments might be most unfortunate.

Acceptance by the American Government of the Japanese proposal of November 26 would have meant condonation by the United States of Japan's past aggressions, assent by the United States to unlimited courses of conquest by Japan in the future, abandonment by the United States of its whole past position in regard to the most essential principles of its foreign policy in general, betrayal by the United States of China, and acceptance by the United States of a position as a silent partner aiding and abetting Japan in her effort to create a Japanese hegemony in and over the western Pacific and eastern Asia; it would have destroyed the chances of asserting and maintaining American rights and interests in the Pacific; and in its final analysis would have meant a most serious threat to American national security. Japan also clinging to her vantage point in Indo-China which threatened the security of the countries to the south and menaced vital trade routes. Their conditional offer to withdraw troops from southern Indo-China to northern Indo-China was meaningless as they could have brought those troops back to southern Indo-China within a day or two, and furthermore they placed no limit on the number of troops they might continue to send there.

On November 26, the Secretary of State made a reply to the Japanese representatives in the form of two documents, the first, an outline in a tentative form of a proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan, and the second, an explanatory statement in regard to it. A copy of that document is annexed as Exhibit L.

Although, it subsequently appeared, the Japanese treated the November 26 proposal as finally disposing of the question of negotiating a peaceful settlement covering the Pacific area, they kept up the appearance of continuing negotiations right down to December 7.

On December 2, the President directed that inquiry be made at once of the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu in regard to the reasons for continued Japanese troop movements into Indo-China. On December 5, the Japanese Ambassador called and presented to the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, a reply to the President's inquiry of December 2 containing the specious statement that Japanese reinforcements had been sent to Indo-China as a precautionary measure against Chinese troops in bordering Chinese territory. On December 6, President Roosevelt telegraphed a personal appeal to the Emperor of Japan that the "tragic possibilities" in the situation be avoided. At the President's express direction the message was sent in the "gray" code, a non-confidential code which the Japanese would have no difficulty in deciphering. In order to assure prompt decoding and delivery by Ambassador Grew of that message, a brief telegram was sent him shortly in advance to be ready for a message to the Emperor which was being put on the wires. The alerting message was dispatched on December 6 at 8 p. m.; the message to the Emperor at 9 p. m. There is annexed as Exhibit M a copy of the message to the Emperor. The press was informed by the White House at about 7.40 p. m. on December 6 of the fact that a message to the Emperor was being dispatched.

On Sunday, December 7, at about 12 o'clock noon, the Secretary of State, in response to a telephone request from the Japanese Ambassador, made an appointment to receive the Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu at 1 p. m. Shortly after 1 p. m., the Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu asked by telephone that the appointment be postponed until 1.45 p. m. They arrived at the Department of State at 2.05 p. m. and were received by the Secretary at 2.20 p. m. The Japanese Ambassador said that he had been instructed by his Government to deliver a paper at 1 p. m., but that difficulty in decoding the message had delayed him. He then handed the Secretary a document, a copy of which is annexed as Exhibit N.

The Japanese message was not a declaration of war with reasons or an ultimatum. It was not even a declaration of intention to sever diplomatic relations.

The allegations in the Japanese message are contrary to fact. Since the outset of the conversations between the two governments, the effort of the Japanese Government was directed toward inducing the United States to surrender its basic policy, while the Japanese Government maintained intact its policy of aggression and force. The immutable policy of the Japanese Government to ensure the stability of East Asia was predicated upon establishing at the outset a complete Japanese military and economic stranglehold over China, calling for Japanese control over strategic Chinese industries and facilities, referred to euphemistically in terms such as "economic cooperation with China," and retention in large areas of China for an indefinite period of large Japanese garrisons to protect Japan's holdings, a stipulation cloaked under the innocent sounding provision "joint-defense against Communism." These terms were embodied in the so-called "treaty" of 1940 between Japan and the puppet Wang Ching-wei regime. The Japanese Government sought to obtain American assent to the imposition of these terms on the Chinese Government. At no time did the Japanese Government budge from insistence upon these terms, and for the Japanese Government to speak of making the utmost concessions is a monstrous distortion of the facts. It was because of this intransigent position of the Japanese Government that it would heed no suggestion looking toward an amicable adjustment of its differences with China. The contention that the Japanese Government's proposal of September 25 was based upon the American proposal is not sustained by a comparison of the two proposals. An analysis of the essential characteristic of the Japanese proposal of November 20 has already been presented above.

Refusal on the part of China to come to agreement with Japan on Japan's terms was due not to failure on the part of China to understand Japan's true intentions, as alleged, but to the fact that Japan's true intentions were clearly understood by China. The American policy of assisting the Chinese Government was inspired by a desire to prevent Japan from coercing China with a peace settlement under which China would become completely dominated by Japan. The policy of the United States and its friends, including the imposition of freezing measures, was one of self-defense against the publicly proclaimed Japanese policy of general aggression. The offer of the Government of the United States, contained in its proposal of June 21, under which the "President of the United States will suggest to the Government of China that the Government of China and the Government of Japan enter into a negotiation on a basis

mutually advantageous and acceptable for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations" was of course made contingent upon Japan's entering into a general agreement along the lines of the June 21 proposal and was never withdrawn. The American Government's proposal of November 26 represented a practical application of principles which had been under discussion during months of negotiations, and was nothing new; it offered Japan various benefits which would have been welcomed by any country bent on pursuing peaceful courses. Such delay as occurred in the conversations arose entirely from the firm adherence of the Japanese Government to its fixed policies of aggression. It is not clear what is meant by the Japanese contention that the American proposal for a multilateral non-aggression pact was far removed from the realities of East Asia, unless it was that the proposal conflicted with the Japanese plan for establishing Japanese domination of the entire Western Pacific area. The charge that the United States was scheming for an extension of the war was, on its face, preposterous. The charge that the United States, in conjunction with Great Britain, was exercising economic pressure in order to deal with international relations refers obviously to the freezing measure which was resorted to as a necessary measure of self-defense after Japan had launched its large-scale forward military movement into Southern Indo-China so as to imperil the security of American, British and Dutch territory. The charge that the United States desired to maintain and strengthen its alleged dominant position in China is, on its face, absurd as the United States never sought nor did it ever have a dominant position in China or in the Far East. With regard to the contention that the United States sought to obstruct the creation by Japan of a new order in East Asia, it is of course true that the United States was consistently opposed to Japan's pretensions to the arrogation to itself of a position of military dominance throughout the Far East and the western Pacific area.

The Secretary of State read the Japanese document, turned to the Japanese Ambassador, and said, "I must say in all my conversations with you /the Japanese Ambassador/ during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions--infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them."

The Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu then took their leave without making any comment.

This interview, as later appeared, took place more than an hour after the Japanese armed forces had struck without warning at Pearl Harbor and over two hours after an actual Japanese landing in Malaya and four hours after they had crossed the boundary of the International Settlement at Shanghai. These facts were not mentioned by Nomura and Kurusu.

JOSEPH W. BALLANTINE

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of June, 1946.

Q. # 1245A

Exhibit "D" Affidavit of Joseph J. Ballantine, 24 June 1946

Table showing in parallel columns differences on essential provisions of substance between the Japanese Government's draft proposal of May 12, 1941, and the American Government's counter-draft of June 21, 1941.

Japanese Government's Draft of May 12

:

American Government's Counter-Draft of June 21

:

II. The attitude of both Governments toward the European War. :

II. The attitude of both Governments toward the European War.

The Governments of the United States and Japan make it their common aim to bring about the world peace; they shall therefore jointly endeavour not only to prevent further extension of the European War but also speedily to restore peace in Europe.

The Government of Japan maintains that its alliance with the Axis Powers was, and is, defensive and designed to prevent the nations which are not at present directly affected by the European War, from engaging in it.

The Government of Japan maintains that its obligations of military assistance under the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy will be applied in accordance with the stipulation of Article 3 of the said Pact.

The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, directed by no such aggressive measures as to assist any one nation against another. The United States maintains that it is pledged to the hate of war, and accordingly, its attitude toward the European War is, and will continue to be, determined solely and exclusively by considerations of the protective defense of its own national welfare and security.

The Government of Japan maintains that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was, and is, defensive and is designed to contribute to the prevention of an unprovoked extension of the European War.

The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European hostilities is and will continue to be determined solely and exclusively by considerations of protection and self-defence: its national security and the defence thereof.

Note (There is appended a suggested draft of an exchange of letters as a substitute for the Annex and Supplement on the Part of the Government of the United States on this subject which constituted a part of the draft of May 31, 1941. For discussion of the fundamental question underlying this whole section, vide the Oral Statement handed the Japanese Ambassador on June 21.)

(See also suggested exchange of letters Annex 3.)

Exhibit "D" - cont'd

Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine, 24 June 1946

Japanese Government's Draft of May 12

III. The relations of both nations toward the China Affair.

The Government of the United States, acknowledging the three principles as enunciated in the Konoe Statement and the principles set forth on the basis of the said three principles in the treaty with the Nanking Government as well as in the Joint Declaration of Japan, Manchoukuo and China and relying upon the policy of the Japanese Government to establish a relationship of neighborly friendship, shall forthwith request the Chiang Kai-shek regime to negotiate peace with Japan.

(Excerpt from accompanying oral explanation.)

III. China Affair.

The terms for China-Japan peace as proposed in the original Understanding differ in no substantial way from those herein affirmed as the "principles of Konoe". Practically, the one can be used to explain the other.

We should obtain an understanding, in a separate and secret document, that the United States would discontinue her assistance to the Chiang Kai-shek regime if Chiang Kai-shek does not accept the advice of the United States that he enter into negotiations for peace.

If, for any reason, the United States finds it impossible to sign such a document, a definite pledge by some highest authorities will suffice.

: American Government's Counter-Draft of June 21

III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan

The Japanese Government having communicated to the Government of the United States the general terms within the framework of which the Japanese Government will propose the negotiation of a peaceful settlement with the Chinese Government, which terms are declared by the Japanese Government to be in harmony with the Konoe principles regarding neighborly friendship and mutual respect of sovereignty and territories and with the practical application of those principles, the President of the United States will suggest to the Government of China that the Government of China and the Government of Japan enter into a negotiation on a basis mutually advantageous and acceptable for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations.

Note (The foregoing draft of Section III is subject to further discussion of the question of cooperative defense against communistic activities, including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory, and the question of economic cooperation between China and Japan. With regard to suggestions that the language of Section III be changed, it is believed that consideration of any suggested change can most advantageously be given after all the points in the annex relating to this section have been satisfactorily worked out, when the section and its annex can be viewed as a whole.)

Exhibit "D" - cont'd

Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine, 24 June 1946

Japanese Government's Draft of May 12

III. China Affair (cont'd)

The three principles of Prince Konoe as referred to in this paragraph are:

1. Neighborly friendship;
2. Joint defense against communism;
3. Economic cooperation - by which Japan does not intend to exercise economic monopoly in China nor to demand of China a limitation in the interests of Third Powers.

The following are implied in the aforesaid principles:

1. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories;
2. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming a Far Eastern nucleus contributing to world peace;
3. Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China;
4. No annexation, no indemnities;
5. Independence of Manchoukuo.

* * * * *

American Government's Counter-Draft of June 21

Annex and Section III

III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.

The basic terms as referred to in the above section are as follows:

1. Neighborly friendship.
2. (Cooperative defense against injurious communistic activities - including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory.) Subject to further discussion.
3. (Economic cooperation.) Subject to agreement on an exchange of letters in regard to the application to this point of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.
5. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming an East Asian nucleus contributing to world peace.
6. Withdrawal of Japanese armed forces from Chinese territory as promptly as possible and in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China.
7. No annexation.
8. No indemnities.
9. Amicable negotiations in regard to Manchoukuo.

(See also suggested exchange of letters Annex 4.)

* * * * *

Exhibit "D" - cont'd
Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine, 24 June 1946

Japanese Government's Draft of May 12

IV. Commerce between both nations.

(No material difference except for Annex 2 contained in American proposal.)

* * * *

V. Economic activity of both nations in the Southwestern Pacific area.

Having in view that the Japanese expansion in the direction of the Southwestern Pacific area is declared to be of peaceful nature, American cooperation shall be given in the production and procurement of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which Japan needs.

* * * *

VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

a. The Governments of the United States and Japan jointly guarantee the independence of the Philippine Islands on the condition that the Philippine Islands shall maintain a status of permanent neutrality. The Japanese subjects shall not be

: American Government's Counter-Draft of June 21

IV. Commerce between both nations.

* * * *

V. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.

On the basis of mutual pledges hereby given that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward obtaining non-discriminatory access by Japan and by the United States to commercial supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy.

* * * *

VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

Both Governments declare that the controlling policy underlying this understanding is peace in the Pacific area; that it is their fundamental purpose, through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation of peace in the

Exhibit "D" - cont'd
Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine, 24 June 1946.

Japanese Government's Draft of May 12

VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area. (cont'd)

subject to any discriminatory treatment.

b. Japanese immigration to the United States shall receive amicable consideration - on a basis of equality with other nationals and freedom from discrimination.

Addendum.

The present Understanding shall be kept as a confidential memorandum between the Governments of the United States and Japan.

The scope, character and timing of the announcement of this Understanding will be agreed upon by both Governments.

* * * * *

* * * * *

: American Government's Counter Draft of June 21

VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area. (cont'd)

Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs in the area mentioned.

* * * * *

VII. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands

The Government of Japan declares its willingness to enter at such time as the Government of the United States may desire into negotiation with the Government of the United States with a view to the conclusion of a treaty for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands. When Philippine independence shall have been achieved.

* * * * *

Ex 1245-A
Doc 2215, Exhibit D

證據彙編 D

ジョゼフ・ダブリウ・バラントインノ一九四六年

(昭和二十一年)六月二十二日附口供書

一九四一年(昭和十六年)五月十二日附日本政府提案宣稱ト同年六月
二十一日附米國政府對提案草案間ノ重要條項上ノ相異對照表

五月十二日附日本政府草案

ニ歐洲戰爭ニ對スル兩國政府ノ

態度

日本及米國政府ハ世界平和ノ指
來ヲ共同ノ目標トシ相協力シテ
歐洲戰爭ノ擴大ヲ防止スルノミ
ナラズ歐洲ニ於ケル其ノ遠方ナ
ル平和克復ニ努メス

日本國政府ハ福福同盟ヲ過去及
現在ニ於テ防禦的ニシテ現ニ歐
洲戰爭ニ直接ニ關係ナキ國家ノ
戰爭參加ヲ防止スルニ在ルモノ
ナルコトヲ闡明ス。

日本國政府ハ日佛伊三國條約ニ
基ク軍事的援助義務ハ同條約第
三條ニ規定セラルル場合ニ於テ
發動セラルルモノナルコトヲ闡
明ス

六月二十一日附米國政府對提案草案

ニ歐洲戰爭ニ對スル兩國政府ノ態度

日本國政府ハ三國條約ノ目的ヲ過
去ニ於テモ又現在ニ於テモ防禦的
ニシテ洗發ニヨラサル歐洲戰爭ノ
擴大防止ニ寄與セントスルモノナ
ルコトヲ闡明ス

米國政府ハ其ノ歐洲戰爭ニ對スル
態度ハ現在及今後モ態度ハ防禦ト
自衛即チ自國ノ安全ト之ヲ防禦ノ
考慮ニ依リテノミ決セラルベキ
モノナルコトヲ闡明ス

注 一九四一年/昭和十六年/五月
三十一日迄ノ一部分ヲナセル本
間題ニ對スル米國政府ノ附屬說
加筆ノ後リトシテ茲ニ交換公文

米國政府ハ其ノ歐洲戰ニ對スル
態度ハ現在及將來ニ於テ一方ノ
國ヲ援助シテ他方ヲ攻撃セント
スルノ如キ攻撃的施策ニ出デザ
ルベキコトヲ兩院ス米國政府ハ
戰爭ヲ厭惡スルコトニ於テ半國
タルモノアリ從ツテ其ノ歐洲戰
争ニ對スル態度ハ現在及將來ニ
互リ互ラ目國ノ福祉ト安全トヲ
防禦スルノ考慮ニ依リテノミ決
セラルベキモノナルコトヲ兩院
ス

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

日華間ニ對スル兩國政府ノ

關係

米國政府ハ近衛聲明ニ示サレタ
ル三原則及右ニ添キ南京政府ト
締結セラレタル條約及日華共
同宣言ニ明示セラレタル原則ヲ
了承シ且ツ日本政府ノ中國トノ
善隣友好ノ政策ニ信賴シ直ニ將

ノ試案添附セラル本項全部ノ
送附ヲナス根本問題ノ協議ニ
就テハ六月二十一日、日本大
使ヘ手交セラレタル口頭聲明

文参照

（荷添附書第三號交換公文草案參照
ノコト）

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

日華間ノ平和的解決ニ對スル措置
日本國政府ハ米國政府ニ對シ日本
國政府ガ中國政府トノ和平解決交
渉ヲ提議スベキ場合ニ於ケル一般
條件即チ日本國政府ノ聲明スルト
コロニ依レバ善隣友好及主權及領
土ノ相互尊重ニ對スル近衛原則並
ニ右原則ノ實際的運用ニ矛盾セザ

3.

Doc 2215, Exhibit D

政府ニ對シ日本ト和平ノ交渉ヲ
ナスベキ報告ヲ為スベシ

(添附ノ口頭説明ノ返答)

三 文部事務

原了郎ニ對シハセラレタル日華和
平條約ハ「平等原則」トシテ茲
ニ締結セルモノト實質的ニ何等
異ルモノニ非ズ實際前者ハ後者
ノ説明ニ用ヒ得ルモノナリ若シ
蔣介石ニシテ和平交渉開始ノ米國
ノ報告ヲ受諾セザル場合米國側
ニ於テハ蔣介石政府援助ヲ停止
スベキ旨了解ヲ得ル秘密文書シ
テ受信スベキモノトス若シ米國
側ニテ新ル舊領ニ關印シ得ル事
情アラバ最高ノ確ナル筋ノ確約
ニテモ可ナリ

三 文部事務 (ツツキ)

ルモノナル條件ヲ報シタルヲ以
テ米國大統領ハ日華兩國政府ガ相
互ニ有利ニシテ且受諾シ得ベキ基
礎ニ於テ戰闘行為ノ終結及平和條
約ノ恢復ノタメ交渉ニ入ルヤウ中
國政府ニ懇願スベシ

註 (第三項ノ前記英文ハ中國領土
内ノ日本軍ノ駐屯ヲ初メトシ共產運
動ニ對スル共同防衛問題及日華間ノ
經濟的協力ノ問題ニ關スル今後ノ討
議ニ依リ變更セラレルコトアルベシ
第二項ノ英文修正ノ提議ニ對シテハ
如何ナル修正提議モ本項ニ關シ附屬
書ニ添ゲラレタル一切ノ點ガ満足ニ
起草セラレ本項及附屬書ガ全體トシ
テ検討シ得ルニ至リタル上ニテ考究
スルガ最モ好都合ナリト倡ズ

三 日華間ノ和平解決ニ對スル措置
上項ニ於ケル所記基本條件トハ左
ノ如シ

4.

Doc 2215, Exhibit D

本項ニ述ブル近衛三原則トハ

一 善隣友好

二 共產主義ニ對スル共同防衛

三 經濟的協力ノ之ニ依リ日本ハ

中國ニ於テ經濟的獨占ヲ行ヒ又

ハ中國ニ對シ第三國トノ利害關

係ニ限度ヲ設スル意圖ヲ有ス

ルモノニアラズ

前述原則ハ右ノ事項ヲ包含ス

1 主權及領土ノ相互尊重

2 善隣トシテ協力シ世界平和ニ

貢獻スル態度中核ヲ形成スル各

國固有ノ特權ニ對スル相互尊重

3 日華間ニ締結セラルベキ協定ニ

從ヒ中國領土ヨリノ日本軍撤退

4 非併合、無賠償

5 滿洲國ノ獨立

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

一 善隣友好

二 有害ナル共產運動ニ對スル共

同防衛ハ中國領土内ニ於ケル

日本軍隊ノ駐屯ヲ含ム今後

更ニ附議ニ決定スベシ

三 經濟的協力ハ國際通商關係ニ

於ケル無差別待遇ノ原則ヲ本

國ニ適用スルコトニ付テノ交

渉公文ニ對スル合意ニ依リ決

定スルモノトス

四 主權及領土ノ相互尊重

五 善隣國トシテ協力シツツアリ

且世界平和ニ貢獻スベキ東亞

ノ中核ヲ形成シツツアル各國

民固有ノ特權ニ對スル相互尊

重

六 出來得ル限り速ニ日華間ニ

締結セラルベキ協定ニ從ヒ中

國領土ヨリ日本ノ軍隊ヲ撤退

スベキコト

七 非併合

Doc 2215, Exhile D

四 兩國間ノ通商

(米國案 吾マ ルル添附 第二號ヲ除キ實テの相違ナシ)

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

兩國太平洋方面ニ於ケル兩國ノ
經濟活動

日本ノ兩國太平洋方面ニ於ケル
發展ハ平和的手段ニ依ルモノト
ルコトノ闡明セラレタルニ鑑ミ
日本ノ欲スル同方面ニ於ケル資
源(例ヘバ石油、鐵礦、錫、ニ
ツクル等)ノ生産及獲得ニ關シ
米國側ハ之ニ力スルモノトス

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

六 太平洋地域ニ於ケル政治的安
定ニ影響アル兩國ノ方針

5.

八 無賠償

九 滿洲國ニ關スル友誼的交渉
(附屬 第四號ノ交渉 全文試案ヲ
モ参照ノコト)

四 兩國間ノ通商

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

六 太平洋地域ニ於ケル兩國ノ經
濟活動

太平洋地域ニ於ケル日本國及米
國ノ活動ハ平和的手段ニ依リ且
國際通商關係ニ於ケル無差別待
遇ノ原則ニ違ヒ行ハルベシトノ
茲ニ爲サレタル相互的誓約ニ基
キ日本國政府及米國政府ハ兩國
ガ夫々自國經濟ノ保全及發展ノ
爲ニ必要トスル天然資源(例ヘ
バ石油、鐵礦、錫、ニツクル等
)ノ商業的供給ノ無差別均霑
ヲ受ケ得ル様相互ニ協カスベキ

6.

Doc 2215, Exhibit D

A 日米兩國政府ハ此等ヲシテ永

久中立ヲ保持セシムルコトヲ

條件トシテ其ノ獨立ヲ共同ニ

保障ス

日本國民ハ何等差別待遇ヲ受

ケザルモノトス

B 米國ニ對スル日本移民ハ友好

的ニ考慮セラレ他國民ト同等

ノ無差別ノ待遇ヲ與ヘラルベ

シ

附則

本了解事項ハ日米兩國政府間

ノ秘密文書トス本了解事項發

表ノ範圍、性質及時期ハ兩國

政府間ニ於テ協定スルモノト

ス

XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

コトヲ知ス

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

太平洋ノ政治的安定ニ影響アル

兩國ノ方針

兩國政府ハ本了解ノ基礎ヲナス

支配的方針ハ太平洋地域ニ於ケ

ル平和ナルコト、勢力の努力ニ

ヨリ太平洋地域ニ於ケル平和ノ

維持及保全ニ貢獻スルハ兩國政

府ノ根本目的ナルコト並ニ兩國

ノイズレモ前記地域ニ於テ領土

的企圖ヲ有セザルコトヲ聲明ス

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

セビ律賓諸島ノ中立

日本國政府ハ米國政府ガ希望ス

ル時期ニ於テ米國政府ト比律賓

ノ獨立ノ完成セララルベキ際ニ於

ケル比律賓諸島ノ中立化ノタメ

ノ條約締結ヲ目的トスル交渉

ニ入ル用意アルコトヲ聲明ス

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

EXHIBIT "I" - Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine, 24 June 1946

"THE JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER (PRINCE KONOYE) TO
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

"I deeply appreciate the courtesy of Your Excellency in delivering personally to Ambassador Nomura the reply of the United States Government to the proposal of the Japanese Government regarding a meeting between your Excellency and myself.

"In the face of universal warlike turmoil Japan and the United States are the last two major Powers who hold the key to international peace. That the two nations should fall in the worst of relations at this time would mean not only a disaster in itself, but also the collapse of world civilization. Japan is solicitous for the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and the peace of the world and she desires therefore to improve Japanese-American relations.

"The present deterioration of the Japanese-American relations is largely due, I feel, to a lack of understanding which has led to mutual suspicions and misapprehensions, and also encouraged the machinations and maneuvers of Third Powers.

"Without first eliminating such causes, it is impossible to expect adjustment of Japanese-American relations. This is why I wish to meet Your Excellency personally for a frank exchange of views.

"The preliminary informal conversations, disrupted July last, were quite appropriate both in spirit and content. But the idea of continuing those conversations and to have their conclusion confirmed by the responsible heads of the two Governments does not meet the need of the present situation which is developing swiftly and may produce unforeseen contingencies.

"I consider it, therefore, of urgent necessity that the two heads of the Governments should meet first to discuss from a broad standpoint all important problems between Japan and America covering the entire Pacific area, and to explore the possibility of saving the situation. Adjustment of minor items may, if necessary, be left to negotiations between competent officials of the two countries, following the meeting.

"Such is my aim in making the present proposal. I sincerely hope my views in this regard are fully understood and reciprocated by Your Excellency.

"Because of the nature of the meeting as stated above, I would prefer that it will take place as soon as possible.

"[Tokyo,] August 27, 1941.

"Statement by the Japanese Government Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to President Roosevelt on August 28, 1941.

"The Japanese Government has received the communication conveyed by the Secretary of State and the President of the United States to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, 1941. The Japanese Government desires to state its views as follows:

"The Japanese Government profoundly regrets that despite the pledge it has given heretofore as well as its repeated explanations concerning Japan's actions and measures in the foreign field, the United States Government continues to entertain misgivings.

"The United States Government mentions certain situations and measures which it regards as inimical to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area. In an atmosphere of world crisis and international confusion, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain when an event is a cause and when it is a consequence.

"When a nation is obstructed in the path of natural and peaceful development or when the means of its existence is threatened, not only is it imperative that that nation should take defensive measures, but it is also required to do so for the maintenance of a just peace. This was the motivating policy of the Japanese Government.

"Meanwhile, the United States had taken certain measures which could be interpreted in Japan as indicative of a continuing unfriendly pressure at variance with the then current amicable conversations.

"The United States Government certainly regards some of its actions as merely counter-measures against Japan's policy and procedures which were considered as conflicting with American interests and principles. On the other hand, to the Japanese Government those procedures were determined by considerations of self-protection for meeting national requirements or removing environmental and political obstacles against national security.

"With admirable modesty of mind, the Government of the United States has seemed frequently unaware that its words and policies are automatically weighted with the immense power of America's accomplished facts, natural endowment and potential might. The President of the United States, and the Secretary of State, in their own unquestioning adherence to the ways of peaceful procedures, might find it difficult to believe that other nations, anywhere, could consider themselves threatened by the United States.

"Yet, as long as there is lacking the assuagement of that possible threat, there will be some less favorably endowed (especially in essential resources) who will feel compelled to consider defensively their relations with the United States.

"In consequence, the Japanese Government welcomes the invitation by the Government of the United States to an exchange of views in regard to basic policies and attitudes as the foundation of an understanding that will condition lasting and extensive peace in the Pacific area. For such peace, the Government of Japan is ready: for such a united effort toward a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation the Government of Japan, like the Government of the United States, would be proud to make sacrifices.

"Japan's measure in Indo-China was intended to accelerate the settlement of the China Incident; and at the same time it was calculated to remove all menace to the peace of the Pacific and to secure to Japan an equitable supply of essential materials. It was a measure of self-defense the Japanese Government felt obliged to take. But the Japanese Government has no intention of threatening thereby other countries.

"Therefore, the Japanese Government is prepared to withdraw its troops from Indo-China as soon as the China Incident is settled or a just peace is established in East Asia.

"Furthermore, in order to remove all possible doubt in this regard, the Japanese Government reaffirms herewith its repeated declaration that its present action in Indo-China is not a preparatory step for military advance into neighboring territories. The Japanese Government believes the above pledge will suffice to clarify also Japan's intentions toward Thailand.

"As regards Soviet-Japanese relations, the Japanese Government declares likewise that Japan will take no military action as long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty and does not menace Japan or Manchoukuo or take any action contrary to the spirit of the said treaty. On the other hand, the Japanese Government sincerely hope that the United States Government will avoid any action that might give rise to a fear of menace to Japan through collaboration with the Soviet Union.

"In a word, the Japanese Government has no intention of using, without provocation, military force against any neighboring nation.

"Quite properly, discussions between the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States directed toward ascertaining if there existed a basis for negotiations for a peaceful settlement covering the entire situation,-- such discussions would naturally envisage the working out of a progressive program, obtainable by peaceful methods. The Japanese Government shares fully that view with the Government of the United States.

"It is also stated by the United States Government that no proposals or suggestions affecting the rights and privileges of either the United States or Japan would be considered except as these might be in conformity with the basic principles to which the United States has long been committed. The fundamental national policy long cherished by the Japanese Government is again in full agreement on that point.

"Regarding the principles and directives set forth in detail by the American Government and envisaged in the informal conversations as constituting a program for the Pacific area, the Japanese Government wishes to state that it considers these principles and the practical application thereof, in the friendliest manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world. Such a program has long been desired and sought by Japan itself.

"The Japanese Government now confidently hopes that from the larger viewpoint of a constructive world peace, and in the light of the current international situation, past differences may be merged in an agreement of principles and a cooperative effort based on order and justice. The meeting of the responsible heads of our respective Governments would confirm and give such sanction to our purposes that peace in the Pacific would be instituted by that meeting." (Foreign Relations, Vol. II, p. 572-575)

- - - - -

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

No. 7

Ex. 1245-B Doc 2215 Exhibit E

証據書類「エ」ヨサ、ガハ、バ、タ、イ、ノ、
一九四五年、昭和二十年六月二十四日附口供書。
日本總理大臣(近衛文相)ヨリ大統領「ヒュースベルト」ニ宛テ
貴大統領ト本大臣ト、會見ニ関スル書面ヲ提案ニ付ス
ル合衆國政府、回答ヲ貴大統領ヨリ直接野村大使ニ
手交セラシタルハ本大臣、深ク多ク之ニ所以ナリ。
現下世界動乱ニ當リ國際平和、鑒ヲ握ニ最後ノ三國
即チ日米兩國、此、儘最悪ノ關係ニ進ムコトハ夫レ
自任極メテ不幸ナルコトナリ、ミナツズ世界文明ノ没落
ヲ意味スルモノナリ、我々が日米國交改善ヲ願フ念ハ、
單ニ太平洋平和維持、爲ミナツズ之ヲ契機トシテ
世界平和ノ招来ニ資セントスルニ外ナラズ。
惟フニ日米兩國間、關係が今日、如何惡化
シタル原因ハ主トシテ兩國政府間ニ在リ、
疎通ヲ欠キ相互ニ疑感誤解ヲ重ネタルト
ナリ、兩國、謀略策動ニ由ルモノトナリ。
先ツ斯ル原因ヲ除去スルニ非ラザレバ兩國國交
ノ調整ハ到在期ニ難シ。是本大臣が直接貴
大統領ト會見ニテ率直ニ雙方ノ見解、

Doc 2215 Exhibit E.

解ラ被遷セントスル所以ナリ。而ミテ七月以來中
断ニタル予備的公式商議ハ其精神及内
容概ネ妥當ナルモ今後引續キ商議ヲ進メ然
ル後^(首腦)兩國間ニ於テ之ヲ確認セントスル從來考ヘ
ラレタルガ如キ遺リロハ急激ナル進展ヲナシツ
テ或ハ不測ノ事態ヲ惹起スルノ虞下シトセザ
ル現在ノ時局ニ適合ヤスルハ兩國首腦者直
接會見ミテ大所商討ヨリ日米兩國間ニ存
在スル太平洋全般ニ亙ル重要問題ヲ討議シ
時局放齊ノ可能性アリヤ否ヤヲ検討スルニ
ガ喫緊ノ必要事ニシテ細目ノ如キハ首腦者
會談後必要ニ應ジ事務當局ニ交渉セシメ
テ可ナリ。

本大臣ガ今次提議ヲナセル趣旨自反ニ存ス。
貴大統領ニ於テモ余今此矣ヲ諒解セラシ
「シンプロクト」アラレニコレヲ切望ス。

敍上次第ナリヲ以テ當方ハ會見ノ期一日モ
遅カナリコトヲ希望ス。

「東京ニ於テ」一九四一年／昭和十八年／

八月二十七日

No. 22

Doc 22/5 Exhibit E

3. ★

一九四二年昭和十六年八月二十八日日本大使(野村)ヨリ
大統領にズベルトニ年交タリタル日本政府聲明書
帝國政府ハ一九四二年昭和十六年八月十七日大統領及
國務長官ヨリ在米日本國大使ニ爲サシタル通報
ヲ受領シ右ニ関シ其見解ヲ陳述スルコト左ノ如シ
帝國政府ハ合衆國政府ガ日本國ニ從來ノ誓約並ニ
對外的行動及措置ニ関シ屢次ノ説明ニモ拘ミ
今尚誤解ト危惧シ合ハラ懷キ居ルニコトニ付
深ク遺憾ノ念ヲ持ツル能ハサル次第ナリ
抑モ合衆國政府ハ太平洋地域ニ於ケル平和
決テ有害ナリト認メタル或種ノ状態及措置ヲ摘
セルモ現在ノ如ク世界の危機及國際的混亂
團氣ノ中ニ於テ或ル事件ガ原因ナリヤ又ハ結果
ナリヤヲ確カルコトハ極メテ困難ナル場合アリ
一國ノ自然的平和的發展ガ阻害セラレ又ハ其
生存條件カヤヨリ脅威ヲ與ヘラルカ如キ場合
ニ其國力之ニ對應的措置ヲ執リ又ハ防衛的手段
ニ出スハ萬己ヲ得サルツトノミナラス平和維持上
正ニ当然ノ事ナリト謂ハサルヲ得ス之ハ日本政
府ノ執リタル政策ノ動因ヲナスモノナリ
其ノ間合衆國日米間ニ當時行ハラル友好的會談

Doc, 22/5 Exhibit E

ト牴觸シ繼續的非友誼的壓迫ヲ意味スルモノナリト
日本ニ於テ解釋シ得ラルガ如キ或ル措置ニ出デタリ
合衆國政府ハ右行動ノ或ルモノハ米國ノ利益及原則
ニ有害ナル日本ノ政策及手續ニ對スル對抗措置ニ過
キト思考スルモ他方日本國政府ハ自己ノ行動ガ日本
國ノ國家的必要ノ充足及防護ニ悪影響アル環
境的政治的障害ニ對應セントスル考慮ニ依リ支配
セラレタルモノナリト思考ス

稱讃スベキニノ謙讓ヲ以テテ合衆國政府が自ラ以
テ平和的手段ナリト思考セラル、モノ、中ニモ合衆
國ノ既成ノ事實自然的條件及潛勢力ニヨリ相手國
ニ威力ヲ加ヘラシ居ルコトヲ合衆國ハ看過シ居ル非
ズヤト思考セラル。合衆國大統領及國務長官ハ平
和の手續ノ方法ニ對スル固キ執着ニヨリシテ世界ノ
如何ナル所ニ於テモ他國民が合衆國ニ依リ脅威セラ
ルト感ズルガ如キコトハ信ジ難キコトスルモノナルベ
キモ合衆國ニ比シ不利ナル地位ニ在ル(特ニ重要資
源ニ乏シキ)國民ハ其ノ合衆國トノ關係ヲ防禦
的ニ考慮スルコトヲ余儀ナクセラル、モノナルコト
ヲ深く念記スベキナリ。

★
No 4

Doc-2215 Exhibit E

☆
No 5

從ツテ日本國政府、合衆國政府、此度太平洋地域
於ケル永續的廣汎ナル平和ヲ條件附クベキ了解、
基礎トシテ基本的政策及態度ニ関スル意見、交換ヲ
從通セシメタルコトヲ多トスルモノナリ。

日本政府ハ、カクル平和ニ對シ用意アリ。日本政府、全
太平洋情勢ニツイテ、平和的解決ニ對スル共同ノ努力ニ
對シ米國政府ト同様犧牲ヲハラフコトヲ誇リトスモノナリ。
帝國政府、佛印ニ於ケル措置ハ、日華事變解決促進、
爲メ又太平洋平和攪亂、因タル諸脅威ニ對應シテ
平和ヲ維持シ、必要物資、公平ナル獲得、多メ自衛上
眞ニ已ラザルニ出テタル措置ニシテ之ニヨリ他ニ脅威ヲ
與フヘキ性質ノモノニ非ス。

故ニ帝國政府ハ、日華事變ニシテ解決スルカ又ハ、公正
ナル極東平和ノ確立スルニ於テハ、直チニ兵ヲ佛領
印度支那ヨリ撤收スルノ用意アリ。

尙帝國政府ハ、可能ナル一切ノ疑惑ヲ除去スルカ爲メ
今次ノ佛印防衛措置ハ、近接地域ニ對スル武力的進
出ノ豫備的行動ニ非ストノ屢次聲明ヲ茲ニ改メテ確

言スルト共ニ前記ノ所言ニヨリ帝國政府ノ「タイ」國
ニ對スル意思、尙モ自ラ明カナルヲ信ス。

更ニ曰サ、蘇蘭關係ニ付テモ帝國ハ蘇聯ニ於テ日蘇中立
條約ヲ遵守シ、且ツ日滿ニ對シ脅威ヲ與フル等、同條
約ノ精神ニ反スルカ如キ行動ナキ限り進ニテ武力的行
動ニ出スルコトナキヲ併セテ明言スルモノナリ。他方

Doc. 2215, Exhibit E

合衆國政府ニ於テモ日本側ニ於テ苟モ米蘇共同ニ我國ニ脅威ヲ加フルモノナリトシテ懼レ、念ヲ抱カシムルに如キコトハ總對ニ之ヲ避ケラル、極要證ニ堪ヘズ。要之、帝國政府ハ隣接諸國ニ對シ挑発ナリシヲ進テ武力行使ノ意ヲ嚮ス。

今、所太平洋全局ニ付テ、平和的解決ニ関スル會商、基礎點見テ目的トスル日本國政府及合衆國政府間、討議ハ當然平和的手段ニヨリ達成得ベキプログラムニ立安ホテ豫見スルモノナリカ右ニ付テハ日本國政府モ亦見解ヲ一ニス。

又合衆國政府ハ合衆國若ハ日本國、何レハ權利及特權ニ關聯スル何事モ提案若クハ合衆國カ從來遵奉シ来ル原則ニ適合スルモノヲ除キ考量セラルコトヲ宣明セル處右ハ日本國政府、抱懷スル根本的國是ニ付テモ同様タルモノトス。

合衆國政府ガ詳細ニ説明シ、非公式討議ニ於テ太平洋地域、為ノ「プログラム」トシテ縷述スル原則及ビ指令ニ關シテハ、帝國政府ハコソ

No. 6

★
「
テスル實際ニノ應用コソ眞實ナル平和ノ根本的必須要件」アリ右ハ太平洋地域ノモノナラズ又全世界ニモ適用セラルベキモノナリト信ズ。斯クノ如キ「プログラム」コソ日本ガ永ク希望シ且ツ求メ居タルモノナリ、

No. 7 ★

Doc. 2215,

Exhibit E

日本政府ハ世界平和建設ノ大局的見地ヨリ又現下、
國際情勢ニ鑑ミ過去ノ意見ノ対立ガ秩序ト正義ニ
立脚シタル協力的努力及主義、一致ニ融合シ去リ得ル
コトヲ確信ヲ以テ希望スルモノナリ。
兩國政府、責任アル首腦者ノ會合ハ、太平洋ニ於
ケル平和ハ其會合ニヨツテ設定サルモノナリト言フ者
々ノ目的ヲ確認シ又ソレヲ是認スルモノナルベシ
(外交關係第二卷第五七二——五七五頁)

EXHIBIT "F" - Affidavit of Joseph W. Pallantine, 24 June 1946

"President Roosevelt's Reply to the Japanese Prime Minister (Prince Konoye), Handed to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on September 3, 1941.

"I have read with appreciation Your Excellency's message of August 27, which was delivered to me by Admiral Nomura.

"I have noted with satisfaction the sentiments expressed by you in regard to the solicitude of Japan for the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and Japan's desire to improve Japanese-American relations.

"I fully share the desire expressed by you in these regards, and I wish to assure you that the Government of the United States, recognizing the swiftly-moving character of world events, is prepared to proceed as rapidly as possible toward the consummation of arrangements for a meeting at which you and I can exchange views and endeavor to bring about an adjustment in the relations between our two countries.

"In the statement which accompanied your letter to me reference was made to the principles to which the Government of the United States has long been committed and it was declared that the Japanese Government 'considers these principles and the practical application thereof, in the friendliest manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world' and that 'such a program has long been desired and sought by Japan itself'.

"I am very desirous of collaborating with you in efforts to make these principles effective in practice. Because of my deep interest in this matter I find it necessary that I constantly observe and take account of developments both in my own country and in Japan which have a bearing upon problems of relations between our two countries. At this particular moment I cannot avoid taking cognizance of indications of the existence in some quarters in Japan of concepts which, if widely entertained, would seem capable of raising obstacles to successful collaboration between you and me along the line which I am sure we both earnestly desire to follow. Under these circumstances, I feel constrained to suggest, in the belief that you will share my view, that it would seem highly desirable that we take precaution, toward ensuring that our proposed meeting shall prove a success, by endeavoring to enter immediately upon preliminary discussion of the fundamental and essential questions on which we seek agreement. The questions which I have in mind for such preliminary discussions

involve practical application of the principles fundamental to achievement and maintenance of peace which are mentioned with more specification in the statement accompanying your letter. I hope that you will look favorably upon this suggestion."

(Foreign Relations, Vol. II, p. 591-592)

- - - - -

Exhibit "F"

Doc 2215, Exhibit F

Ex 1245-C

議定書「下」一九四六年／昭和二十一年／六月二十四日

「ジョウゼフ・ダブリエー・ペラングイン」ノ宣誓口供書

一九四一年／昭和十六年／九月三日、日本大使
(野村)ニ手交セラレタル日本總理大臣(近衛公
信)宛「ルーズベルト」大統領ノ同答

野村海軍大將ヨリ余ニ手交セラレタル八月二十七
日附閣下ノ「メッセーヂ」有難ク拜読セリ。

太平洋ノ平和ヲ維持セントスル日本ノ希求及ビ日米
國交ヲ改善セントスル日本ノ希望ニ固シ違ベラレタ
ル閣下ノ意見ハ洵ニ満足ノ至リナリ

余モ是等ノ點ニ固シ閣下ノ表現セラレタル所ト全然
希望ヲ同ジクスルモノニシテ更ニ世界情勢ノ急變シ
ツツアル趣向ニ鑑ミ合衆國政府ハ閣下及余ガ意見ヲ
交換シ我々兩國間ニ國交調整ヲ齎ラスコトニ努力シ
得ラルル會談ノ準備ノ完了ヲ出來得ル限リ速カニ取
運ブノ用意アル事ヲ保證致シ度シ

閣下ノ余ニ宛テタル「メッセーヂ」ニ添附セラレタ
ル「ステートメント」ニ於テ合衆國政府多年遂行
シ來タレル政策ハ言及セテ日本政府ハ該諸原

1.
COPY

「下」

Doc 2215, Exhibit F

2.

則及其ノ最良變的方法ニ依ル實際的適用ガ眞ノ平和ノ基盤ヲ爲スニシテ且茲ニ太平洋地帯ノミナラス全世界ヲ通ジテ適用セラルベキモノト思考スル旨竝ニ「新カール・プログラム」ハ日本自身が長ラク念願希望セルモノナル旨言明セラレタリ。

余ハ是等諸原則ヲ實際ニ効果アラシメントスル努力ニ閣下ト協力センコトヲ衷心ヨリ希望スルモノナリ。

余ハ此ノ問題ニ深甚ナル關心ヲ寄スルモノナルニヨリ、余ハ我々兩國間ノ國交問題ニ影響アル自國竝ニ日本ニ於クル情勢ハ常ニ之ヲ觀察シ考慮スルノ必要アルモノト感ズ。特ニ此ノ際余ハ日本ノ或ル方面ニ於テ若シ多クノ者ガ新カール觀念ヲ抱懷スルニ於テハ我等兩人ガ衷心則ラント欲スルモノト余ガ確信スル方針ニ添フ閣下ト余トノ間ノ協力ノ成功ニ障害トナリ得ベシト認メラルル觀念ガ存在スル兆候ヲ認メザルヲ得ズ新カール情勢下ニ於テ余ハ閣下ガ余ノ意見ニ同意セラルルモノト信ジ、提案サレタル我々ノ會談ノ成功ヲ期スル爲我々が意見ノ一致ヲ求メントスル根本的ニシテ且緊要ナル問題ノ豫備前議ニ直テニ入ル事ニ努力シ依ツテ以テ疲倦ヲ拂フコト最モ望マシ

Doc 2215, Exhibit F

3.

キコトナルコトヲ申上ゲザルヲ得ズ。新カル豫備討
議ノ爲余ノ念頭ニアル諸問題ハ閣下ノ「メツセーヂ」
ニ添附セラレタル「ステートメント」ニヨリヨク特記
セラレタ平和ノ確立保全ノ差關ヲ成ス諸原則ノ實用
的適用ヲ含ムモノナリ閣下ガ本提案ヲ厚意ヲ以テ觀
ラレン事ヲ望ム

(分田關係、第二卷、第五九一頁乃至第五九二頁)

EXHIBIT "G" - Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine, 24 June 1946

"DRAFT PROPOSAL HANDED BY THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA)
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1941.

"The Government of Japan undertakes:

"(a) that Japan is ready to express its concurrence in those matters which were already tentatively agreed upon between Japan and the United States in the course of their preliminary informal conversations;

"(b) that Japan will not make any military advancement from French Indo-China against any of its adjoining areas, and likewise will not, without any justifiable reason, resort to military action against any regions lying south of Japan;

"(c) that the attitudes of Japan and the United States towards the European War will be decided by the concepts of protection and self-defense, and, in case the United States should participate in the European War, the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact by Japan shall be independently decided;

"(d) that Japan will endeavor to bring about the rehabilitation of general and normal relationship between Japan and China, upon the realization of which Japan is ready to withdraw its armed forces from China as soon as possible in accordance with the agreements between Japan and China;

"(e) that the economic activities of the United States in China will not be restricted so long as pursued on an equitable basis;

"(f) that Japan's activities in the Southwestern Pacific Area will be carried on by peaceful means and in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce, and that Japan will cooperate in the production and procurement by the United States of natural resources in the said area which it needs.

"(g) that Japan will take measures necessary for the resumption of normal trade relations between Japan and the United States, and in connection with the above-mentioned, Japan is ready to discontinue immediately the application of the foreigners' transactions control regulations with regard to the United States on the basis of reciprocity.

"The Government of the United States undertakes:

"(a) that, in response to the Japanese Government's commitment expressed in point (d) referred to above, the United States will abstain from any measures and actions which will be prejudicial to the endeavour by Japan concerning the settlement of the China Affair;

"(b) that the United States will reciprocate Japan's commitment expressed in point (f) referred to above;

"(c) that the United States will suspend any military measures in the Far East and in the Southwestern Pacific Area;

"(d) that the United States will immediately ^{upon} settlement ⁷ reciprocate Japan's commitment expressed in point (g) referred to above by discontinuing the application of the so-called freezing act with regard to Japan and further by removing the prohibition against the passage of Japanese vessels through the Panama Canal." (Foreign Relations, Vol. II, p. 608-9)

- - - - -

Doc 2215, Exhibit G

證據書類「G」―「ジョセフ・ダブリュー・バラシ
タイン」ノ一九四六年（昭和二十一年）六月二十四
日附口供書

一九四一年（昭和十六年）九月六日、日本大使（野
村）ヨリ國務長官ニ手交セラレタル提案ノ草案
日本政府ハ左ノ諸項ヲ約諾ス

(イ) 日米豫備的非公式會談中ニ一應日米合意ヲ見タ
ル事項ニ付テハ日本ハ賛意ヲ表明スルノ用意アリ
(ロ) 日本ハ佛印ヨリ其ノ隣接地域ニ武力的進出ヲナサ
ズ、又日本ノ南方地方ニ對シテモ同様故ナク武力
的行爲ニ訴ヘザルベシ

(ハ) 日米ノ對歐洲戰事態度ハ防護ト自衛ノ概念ニ依リ
尊セラルベク、又米ノ歐洲戰事入ノ場合ニ於ケル
三國條約ニ對スル日本ノ解釋及之ニ伴フ實行ハ自
主的ニ行ハルベシ

(ニ) 日本國ハ日華間ノ全面的正常關係ノ回復ニ努メ右
實現ノ上ハ日華間ノ協定ニ基キ中國ヨリ出來得ル
限り速ニ撤兵スルノ用意アリ

(ホ) 中國ニ於ケル合衆國ノ經濟的活動ハ公正ナル基礎
ニ於テ行ハル、限り制限セラレザルベシ

(ヘ) 南西太平洋地域ニ於ケル日本ノ活動ハ平和的手段
ニ依リ且國際通商關係ニ於ケル無差別待遇ノ原則

Ex 1245 D

Doc 2215, Exhibit 6

- ニ違ヒ行ハルベク、合衆國ガ必要トスル同方面ニ
於ケル天然資源ノ生産獲得ニ協カス
- (ト) 日本ハ日米間ニ正常ナル通商關係ヲ恢復セシムル
ニ必要ナル措置ヲ講ズベシ、右ニ關シ日米兩國相
互ニ「レシブロケート」スベキコトヲ條件トシテ
日本ハ外國人ニ對スル取引取締規則ノ適用ヲ直ニ
中止スルノ用意アリ
- 合衆國ハ左ノ諸項ヲ約諾ス
- (イ) 前項(三)ニ掲グル日本ノ約諾ニ對應シ合衆國ハ右日
本ノ日華條約(ノ解決)ニ關スル努力ニ支障ヲ與
フルガ如キ措置及行動ニ出デザルベシ
- (ロ) 前項(ハ)ニ掲グル日本ノ約諾ニ合衆國ハ「レシブロ
ケート」スベシ
- (ハ) 合衆國ハ極東及南西太平洋地域ニ於ケル軍事措置
ヲ停止スベシ
- (ニ) 合衆國ハ(解決ノ上ハ)前項(ト)ニ掲グル日本ノ約
諾ニ直チニ「レシブロケート」シ右ニ於テ言及セ
ラレタル所關對日凍結措置ヲ撤廢シ又日本船舶ニ
對スル「巴拿馬運河」通航禁止ヲ解除スベシ

(外交關係第二卷 第六〇八—九頁)

EXHIBIT "H" - Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine, 24 June 1946

"Enclosure 17

"JAPANESE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED TO THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN
JAPAN (GREW) ON SEPTEMBER 25, 1941

"Tokyo, 7 September 25, 1941.

"The Governments of Japan and of the United States accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement of understanding as expressed in a joint declaration for the resumption of traditional friendly relations.

"Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of the amicable sentiment between their countries should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

"It is the earnest hope of both Governments that, by a cooperative effort, Japan and the United States may contribute effectively toward the establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area and, by the rapid consummation of an amicable understanding, encourage world peace and arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

"For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening.. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general understanding which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and in act.

"It is the belief of both Governments that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated later at a conference.

"Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved; to wit:

- "1. The concepts of Japan and of the United States respecting international relations and the character of nations.
2. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European War.
3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between Japan and China.
4. Commerce between both nations.
5. Economic problems in the Southwestern Pacific area.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

"Accordingly, the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have come to the following mutual understanding and declaration of policy:

Exhibit "H" - cont'd - affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine

"I. The concepts of Japan and of the United States respecting international relations and the character of nations.

"Both Governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation between the peoples of both countries.

"Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household living under the ideal of universal concord through justice and equity; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of other peoples.

"Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.

"II. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European War.

"Both Governments maintain it their common aim to bring about peace in the world, and, when an opportune time arrives, they will endeavor jointly for the early restoration of world peace.

"With regard to developments of the situation prior to the restoration of world peace, both Governments will be guided in their conduct by considerations of protection and self-defense; and, in case the United States should participate in the European War, Japan would decide entirely independently in the matter of interpretation of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, and would likewise determine what actions might be taken by way of fulfilling the obligations in accordance with the said interpretation.

"III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between Japan and China.

"Both Governments, taking cognizance of the fact that the settlement of the China Affair has a vital bearing upon the peace of the entire Pacific area and consequently upon that of the world, will endeavor to expedite a rapid realization of the settlement of the said Affair.

"The Government of the United States, recognizing the effort and the sincere desire on the part of the Japanese Government concerning the peaceful settlement of the China Affair, will, with the intention of facilitating the realization of the settlement, render its good offices in order that the Chungking Government may promptly enter into

Exhibit "H" - cont'd - Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine

negotiations with the Government of Japan for a termination of hostilities and a resumption of peaceful relations, and will refrain from resorting to any measures and actions which might hamper the measures and efforts of the Government of Japan directed toward the settlement of the China Affair.

"The Government of Japan maintains that the basic general terms of peace for the settlement of the China Affair will be in harmony with the principles embodied in the Konoye statement, and those agreements between Japan and China and those matters which have been put into effect in accordance with the said statement; that the economic cooperation between Japan and China will be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in the international commercial relations and also with the principle of especially close relationship which is natural between neighboring countries; and that the economic activities of third Powers in China will not be excluded so long as they are pursued on an equitable basis.

"Note: There is appended a draft of the basic terms of peace between Japan and China.

"IV. Commerce between Japan and the United States.

"Both Governments agree to take without delay measures necessary for resuming normal trade relations between the two countries.

"Both Governments guarantee each other that they will, as the first of the measures envisaged in the preceding paragraph, discontinue immediately the measures of freezing assets now being enforced, and that they will supply mutually such commodities as are, respectively, available and required by either of them.

"V. Economic problems in the Southwestern Pacific area.

"Both Governments mutually pledge themselves that the economic activities of Japan and the United States in the Southwestern Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in the international commercial relations in pursuance of the policy stated in the preceding paragraph, both Governments agree to cooperate each with the other towards the creation of conditions of international trade and international investment under which both countries will have a reasonable opportunity to secure through the trade process the means of acquiring those goods and commodities which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy.

"Both Governments will amicably cooperate for the conclusion and execution of agreements with the Powers concerned in regard to the production and supply, on the basis of non-discrimination, of such specific commodities as oil, rubber, nickel, and tin.

"VI. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

. DOC. NO. 2215

Exhibit "H" - cont'd - Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine

"Both Governments, taking cognizance of the fact that it is a matter of vital importance to stabilize promptly the situation in the Southwestern Pacific area, undertake not to resort to any measures and actions which may jeopardize such stabilization. The Government of Japan will not make any armed advancement, using French Indo-China as a base, to any adjacent area thereof (excluding China), and upon the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area, will withdraw its troops which are now stationed in French Indo-China.

"The Government of the United States will alleviate its military measures in the Southwestern Pacific area.

"Both Governments declare that they respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Thailand and Netherland East Indies, and that they are prepared to conclude an agreement concerning the neutralization of the Philippine Islands when its independence will have been achieved.

"The Government of the United States guarantees non-discriminatory treatment of the Japanese nationals in the Philippine Islands." (Foreign Relations, Vol. II, p. 637-640)

FILE COPY 2215, Exhibit H.

Ex 1245-E

証據書類「五」―「ジョセフ ダブルユー。ペランダイン」ノ

一九四六年／昭和二十一年／六月二十四日附口供書

「別紙 一」

一九四一年／昭和十六年／九月二十五日駐日米國大使（ダルー）ニ

提出シタル日本提議書

「東京」一九四一年／昭和十六年／九月二十五日

合衆國及日本國政府ハ傳統的友好關係回復ノ爲共
同宣言ニ於テ表現セラル、ガ如キ了解ニ關スル一
的協定ノ交渉開始及締結ノ爲共同ノ責任ヲ受諾ス。
兩國々交ノ最近ノ疏隔ノ特定原因ニ歸及スルコト
、兩國間友好的感情惡化ノ原因トナレル事件ノ
所發ヲ防止シ且其ノ不測不幸ナル結果ニ付矯正ヲ圖
コトハ兩國政府ノ衷心ヨリノ希望ナリ
異同ノ努力ニ依リ合衆國及日本國ガ太平洋地域ニ
於テ平和ノ樹立及保持ノ爲有効ナル貢獻ヲ爲スコ
ト及友好的了解ヲ速カニ完成スルコトニ依リ、世界
平和ヲ助長シ且現ニ文明ヲ浸蝕セントスル惧アル惡
ムベキ混亂ヲ假令一掃セザルマデモ之ヲ抑倒スル
トハ兩國政府ノ眞摯ナル希望ナリ。
新カル果敢ナル措置ノ爲ニハ長期ノ交渉ハ不適當ナル
ヲ又效果薄弱ナリ。仍テ兩國政府ハ兩國政府ヲ

Doc 2215, Exhibit H

不取敢道義的ニ且其ノ行動ニ願シ拘束スベキ一種的
了解ヲ成立セシメ之ヲ完成スル爲ニハ適當ノ手段ヲ
采出實施スルコトヲ希望ス。

兩國政府ハ斯カル了解ニハ緊急ヲ要スル重要問題
ノミヲ包含セシメ、後日會議ノ審議ニ譲リ得ベキ附
屬的事項ハ之ヲ含マシメサルコト然ルベシト信ス。

兩國政府ハ左ノ如キ特定ノ事意及態度ヲ明瞭ニシ
又ハ改善スルニ於テハ融和關係ノ達成ヲ期待シ得ベシ
ト認ム。

一 國際關係及國家ノ本質ニ關スル合衆國及日本國ノ
觀念

ニ 歐洲戰爭ニ對スル兩國政府ノ態度

三 日華間ノ和平解決ニ對スル措置

四 兩國間ノ通商

五 南西太平洋地域ニ於ケル經濟問題

六 太平洋地域ニ於ケル政治的安定ニ關スル兩國ノ方
針

因テ合衆國政府及日本國政府ハ茲ニ左ノ相互的了
解及政策ノ宣言ニ到達セリ

一 國際關係及國家ノ本質ニ關スル合衆國及日本ノ觀
念

兩國政府ハ其ノ國策ハ永久的平和ノ樹立並ニ兩國
民間ノ相互信頼及協力ノ新時代ノ創始ヲ目的トスル
モノナルコトヲ確認ス。

2.

Doc 2215, Exhibit H

兩國政府ハ各國家及民族ガ正義及和平ニ依ル萬邦
協和ノ理想ノ下ニ生存スル一字ヲナスコトハ其ノ傳
統的及現在ニ於ケル觀念並ニ確信ナルコトヲ聲明ス。
即チ平和的手續ニ依リ規律セラレ、且精神的及物質
的福祉ノ追求ヲ目的トスル相互の利害關係ニ基キ何
レモ等シク權利ヲ享有シ、責任ヲ容認ス。而シテ右
福祉タルヤ、各國家及民族ガ他ノ爲ニ之ヲ毀損スベ
カラザルト同様ニ自ラノ爲ニ之ヲ擁護スベキモノト
ス。更ニ兩國政府ハ他ノ民族ノ抑壓又ハ擄取ヲ排撃
スベキ各自ノ責任ヲ容認ス。

兩國政府ハ國家ノ本質ニ歸スル各自ノ傳統的觀念
並ニ社會的秩序及國家生活ノ基礎的道義的原則ハ引
續キ之ヲ保存スベク、且右道義的原則及觀念ニ反ス
ル外來ノ思想又ハ理念ニ依リ之ヲ變革セシメザルコ
トヲ固ク決意ス。

ニ歐洲戰爭ニ對スル兩國政府ノ態度

兩國政府ハ世界平和ノ振興ヲ共同ノ目標トシテ適
當ナル時機至ル時ハ相協力シテ世界平和ノ速カナル
克復ニ努力スベシ。

世界平和克復前ニ於ケル事態ノ諸發展ニ對シテハ
兩國政府ハ防護ト自衛トノ見地ヨリ行動スベク、又
合衆國ノ歐洲戰爭參入ノ場合ニ於ケル日本國獨逸國
及伊太利國間三國條約ニ對スル日本國ノ解釋及之ニ
伴フ義務履行ハ専ラ自主的ニ行ハルベシ。

3.

Doc 2215, Exhibit A

三 日華間ノ和平解決ニ對スル措置

前國政府ハ日華事變ノ解決ガ太平洋全境ノ平和延
イテハ世界ノ平和ニ至大ノ關係アルヲ認メ之ガ急速
ナル實現促進ノ爲努力スベシ。

合衆國政府ハ日華事變解決ニ對スル日本國政府ノ
努力ト誠意トヲ歡迎シ、之ガ實現促進ノ爲重慶政府
ニ對シ嚴密行爲ノ終結及平和關係ノ回復ノ爲速カニ
日本國政府ト交渉ニ入ル機橋設シラ爲スベク且日本
國政府ノ日華事變解決ニ對スル措置及努力ニ支障ヲ
與フルガ如キ一切ノ措置及行動ニ出デザルベシ。

日本國政府ハ日華事變解決ニ對スル基礎的一般條
件ガ近衛聲明ニ示サレタル原則及右原則ニ基キ實施
セラレタル日華間約定及事項ト矛盾セザルモノナル
コト並ニ日華間ノ經濟協力ハ平和的手段ニ依リ且國
際通商關係ニ於ケル無差別及隣接國間ニ於ケル自然
的特別緊密關係存立ノ原則ニ基キ行ハルベク而シテ
第三國ノ經濟活動ハ公正ナル基礎ニ於テ行ハル、限
リ之ヲ排除スルモノニ非ザルコトヲ闡明ス。

註●●日華和平基礎條件ノ草案ハ別紙ノ通り

四 日米兩國間ノ通商

前國政府ハ兩國間正常ノ通商關係ヲ回復セシムル
ニ必要ナル措置ヲ遲滞ナク講ズルコトニ同意ス。

前國政府ハ前項ノ措置ノ第一着手トシテ現ニ實施
シツ、アル相互ノ凍結措置ヲ直ニ撤廢シ且兩國ノ一

4.

5.

Doc 2215, Exhibit H

方が供給シ得且他方が必長トスルガ如キ物資ヲ相互ニ供給スベキコトヲ保障ス。

東南西太平洋ニ關スル經濟問題

南國政府ハ南西太平洋地域ニ於ケル日本國及合衆國ノ經濟活動ハ平和的手段ニ依リ且國際通商關係ニ於ケル無差別待遇ノ原則ニ遵ヒ行ハルベキコトヲ相互ニ誓約ス。南國政府ハ前項ノ政策遂行ノ爲南國ガ通商手續ニ依リ各國ガ自國ノ經濟ノ安全防衛及發達ノ爲必長トスル商品及物資獲得ノ手段ヲ確保スル爲ノ合理的機會ヲ有シ得ルガ如キ國際通商及國際投資ノ條件創設ニ付相互ニ協力スベキコトニ同意ス。

南國政府ハ石油、鑛藏、ニツケル、錫等ノ特種物資ノ生産及供給ニ付無差別待遇ノ基礎ニ於テ關係諸國トノ協定及其ノ實行ニ關シ友好的ニ協力スベシ。

太平洋地域ニ於ケル政治的安定ニ關スル南國ノ方針

南國政府ハ西南太平洋地域ニ於ケル事態ノ速カナル安定ヲ緊要ナル所以ヲ認メ、右安定ニ脅威ヲ與フルガ如キ措置及行動ニ出デザルベキコトヲ約ス。日本國政府ハ佛領印度支那ヲ基地トシテ其ノ近接地域（支那ヲ除ク）ニ武力的進出ヲ爲サザルベク又太平洋地域ニ於ケル公正ナル平和確立スル場合ニハ現ニ佛領印度支那ニ派遣シ居ル日本國軍隊ハ之ヲ撤退スベシ。

Doc 2215, Exhibit H

合衆國政府ハ西南太平洋地域ニ於ケル軍事的措置
ヲ輕減スベシ。

兩國政府ハ「タイ」及領東印度ノ主權及領土ヲ
尊重スベキコト並ニ比律賓ノ獨立ガ完成セラルベキ
際ニ於テ同群島ノ中立化ニ付協定ヲ締結スルノ用意
アルコトヲ聲明ス。

合衆國政府ハ比律賓群島ニ於ケル日本國人ニ對ス
ル無差別待遇ヲ保障スベシ。

(外交關係 第二卷第六三七頁―第六四〇頁)

EXHIBIT "I" - Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine, 24 June 1946

"TEXT OF BASIC JAPANESE TERMS OF PEACE WITH CHINA

"THE JAPANESE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (TOYODA)
TO THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW).

- "1. Neighborly Friendship.
- "2. Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.
- "3. Cooperative defense between Japan and China.

"Cooperation between Japan and China for the purposes of preventing communistic and other subversive activities which may constitute a menace to the security of both countries and of maintaining the public order in China.

"Stationing of Japanese troops and naval forces in certain areas in the Chinese territory for a necessary period for the purposes referred to above and in accordance with the existing agreements and usages.

- "4. Withdrawal of Japanese armed forces.

"The Japanese armed forces which have been dispatched to China for carrying out the China Affairs will be withdrawn from China upon the settlement of the said Affairs, excepting those troops which come under point 3.

- "5. Economic cooperation.

"(a) There shall be economic cooperation between Japan and China, having the development and utilization of essential materials for national defense in China as its principal objective.

"(b) The preceding paragraph does not mean to restrict any economic activities by third Powers in China so long as they are pursued on an equitable basis.

- "6. Fusion of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and the Wang Ching-wei Government.

- "7. No annexation.

- "8. No indemnities.

- "9. Recognition of Manchoukuo."

(Foreign Relations, Vol. II, p. 633)

Doc 2215 Exhibit I

Ex 1245 A

證據書類(上)「ニシテ」云々「ニ」云々

一九四六年六月二十四日附口供書

日華和平基礎條件

日本外務大臣(豐田)ヨリ駐日米國大使(ル)ニ

一、善隣友好

二、主權及領土、尊重

三、日華共同防衛

日華兩國、安全、脅威トナルベキ共產主義的並ニ其他、秩序攪乱運動防止及治安維持、爲、日華協力

右、爲及從前、取極及慣例ニ基ク一定地域ニ於テ日本國軍隊及船舶部隊、所要期間駐屯

四、撤兵

日華事變遂行、爲中國ニ派遣シタル前号以外、軍隊、事

變解決ニ伴ニ撤退

五、經濟提携

一、中國ニ於テ重要國防資源、開發利用、主トシ日本經濟提携行フ

二、右、公正ナル基礎ニ於テ行ハル在華第三國經濟活動、制限スルコトナシ

六、蔣政權ト汪政府ト、合流

七、非併合

八、無賠償

九、滿洲國承認

(外國關係第二卷第六三三頁)

RETURN TO ROOM 361

FILE COPY

EXHIBIT "J" - Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine, 24 June 1946

"ORAL STATEMENT FURNISHED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE JAPANESE
AMBASSADOR (NOHURA) ON OCTOBER 2, 1941

"Washington, 7 October 2, 1941

"Reference is made to the proposals of the Japanese Government communicated on September 6, 1941, by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State, and to statements relating thereto subsequently communicated to this Government by the Japanese Government.

"Thoughtful study has been given to the communications to which reference is made, and in connection with that study careful review has been made of other communications previously received from the Japanese Government on the same subject. On the basis of this study observations are offered as follows:

"The Government of the United States welcomed, as affording a possible opportunity for furthering the broad-range objectives and principles of a program of peace, the Japanese Government's suggestions made through its Ambassador here in the early part of August that there be held a meeting of the responsible heads of the Japanese Government and of the Government of the United States to discuss means for bringing about an adjustment of relations between the United States and Japan and that there be resumed the informal conversations which had been in progress between the two countries to ascertain whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation.

"Accordingly, in the reply made by the President on August 17, 1941, to the Japanese Ambassador the view was expressed that such informal conversations would naturally envisage the working out of a progressive program attainable by peaceful means; that such a program would involve the application in the entire Pacific area of the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment, thus making possible access by all countries to raw materials and to all other essential commodities, and there were described the advantages which would flow to all countries, including Japan, from the adoption of such a program. In conclusion, it was stated that if the Japanese Government were in position to embark upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along the lines of the program and principles to which the United States is committed, this Government would be prepared to consider resumption of the informal exploratory discussions and would be glad to endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place to exchange views.

"In the light of the broad purposes and fundamental principles which this Government holds, it was gratifying to the President and the Government of the United States to receive the message of the Prime Minister and the statement of the Government of Japan on August 28, 1941, containing statements expressing Japan's desire and intent to pursue courses of peace in harmony with the fundamental principles to which the people and Government of the United States are committed. In its statement the Japanese Government gave, with some qualifications, broad assurances of its peaceful intent, including a comprehensive assurance that the Japanese Government has no intention of using without provocation military force against any neighboring nation. The Japanese Government declared that it supported the program and

principles which had been briefly outlined by the President not only as applicable to the Pacific area but also as a program for the entire world.

"The Government of the United States, while desiring to proceed as rapidly as possible with consideration of arrangements for a meeting between the heads of state, felt it desirable, in order to assure that that meeting would accomplish the objectives in view, to clarify the interpretation of certain principles and the practical application thereof to concrete problems in the Pacific area. It has not been the purpose of this Government to enter into a discussion of details; this Government has felt, however, that the clarification sought would afford a means of expediting our effort to arrive at a meeting of minds.

"On September 3, 1941, the President in giving reply to the Japanese Ambassador expressed the earnest desire of the Government of the United States to collaborate in efforts to make effective in practice the principles to which the Japanese Government made reference. The President reiterated the four principles regarded by this Government as the foundation upon which relations between nations should properly rest. Those principles are:

- "1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.
- "2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
- "3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.
- "4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

"The President pointed out that in order to bring about any satisfactory settlement of Pacific questions it was highly important to reach a community of view and a clear agreement upon certain points with respect to which fundamental differences of opinion between our two Governments had developed in the informal conversations; and the President requested an indication of the present attitude of the Japanese Government with regard to those fundamental questions.

"On September 6, the Prime Minister of Japan in a conversation with the American Ambassador at Tokyo stated that he subscribed fully to the four principles above mentioned.

"The foregoing developments and assurances, together with other statements made by the Japanese Government, seemed to justify this Government in concluding that the Japanese Government might be expected to adhere to and to give practical application to a broad progressive program covering the entire Pacific area. It was therefore a source of disappointment to the Government of the United States that the proposals of the Japanese Government presented by the Japanese Ambassador on September 6, 1941, which the Japanese Government apparently intended should constitute a concrete basis for discussions, appeared to disclose divergence in the concepts of the two Governments. That is to say, those proposals and the subsequent explanatory statements made in regard thereto serve, in the opinion of this Government, to narrow and restrict not only the application of the principles upon which our

informal conversations already referred to had been based but also the various assurances given by the Japanese Government of its desire to move along with the United States in putting into operation a broad program looking to the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the entire Pacific area.

"As has already been said, the various broad assurances given by the Japanese Premier and the Japanese Government are highly gratifying. In putting forward its attitude of peaceful intent toward other nations, the Japanese Government qualified its assurances with certain phrases the need for which is not easily understood. It is difficult to conceive of there developing under present circumstances in any of the territories neighboring French Indo-China, in Thailand or in the Soviet Union any aggressive threat or provocation to Japan. The inalienable right of self-defense is of course well recognized by all nations and there could arise in some minds a question as to just what the Japanese Government has in view in circumscribing its assurances of peaceful intent with what would seem to be unnecessary qualifying phrases.

"In the informal conversations there was tentatively arrived at a formula in regard to economic policy (Section V of the draft understanding), which provided that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. In the Japanese Government's proposals of September 6 and in subsequent communications from the Japanese Government the commitments contained in that formula were restricted to the countries of the Southwest Pacific area (not the Pacific area as a whole). In reference to China, the Japanese Government states that it will respect the principle of non-discrimination, but the explanation given in regard to this point would seem to be open to the implication that the Japanese Government has in mind some limitation upon the application of this principle occasioned by reasons of Japan's geographical propinquity to China.

"Obviously, it would not be likely to serve the purposes affirmed by the Japanese Government or by this Government if either the United States or Japan were to pursue one course or policy in certain areas while at the same time pursuing an opposite course or policy in other areas.

"This Government has noted the views of the Japanese Government in support of its desire to station troops for an indeterminate period in certain areas of China. Entirely apart from the question of the reasons for such a proposal, the inclusion of such a provision in the proposed terms of a peaceful settlement between Japan and China at a time when Japan is in military occupation of large areas in China is open to certain objections. For example, when a country in military occupation of territory of another country proposes to the second country the continued stationing of troops of the first country in certain areas as a condition for a peaceful settlement and thus for the withdrawal of the occupational forces from other areas, such procedure would seem to be out of keeping with the progressive and enlightened courses and principles which were discussed in the informal conversations and thus would not, in the opinion of this Government, make for peace or offer prospects of stability.

"It is believed that a clear-cut manifestation of Japan's intention in regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and French Indochina would be most helpful in making known--in particular to those who might be inclined to be critical--Japan's peaceful intentions and Japan's desire to follow courses calculated to establish a sound basis for future stability and progress in the Pacific area.

"With reference to the attitude of each country toward the European war, this Government has noted with appreciation the further step taken by the Japanese Government to meet the difficulties inherent in this aspect of the relations between the two countries. It is believed that it would be helpful if the Japanese Government could give further study to the question of possible additional clarification of its position.

"In the exchanges of views which have taken place between the two Governments in an effort to reach an agreement in principle upon fundamental questions in order to prepare the ground for the proposed meeting of the responsible chiefs of government, this Government has endeavored to make clear that what it envisages is a comprehensive program calling for the application uniformly to the entire Pacific area of liberal and progressive principles. From what the Japanese Government has so far indicated in regard to its purposes this Government derives the impression that the Japanese Government has in mind a program which would be circumscribed by the imposition of qualifications and exceptions to the actual application of those principles.

"If this impression is correct, can the Japanese Government feel that a meeting between the responsible heads of government under such circumstances would be likely to contribute to the advancement of the high purposes which we have mutually had in mind?

"As already stated, this Government welcomed the assurances contained in the statement of the Japanese Government which accompanied the Japanese Prime Minister's message to the President of the United States that the Japanese Government subscribed to the principles which have long been advocated by this Government as the only sound basis for stable international relations. This Government believes that renewed consideration of these fundamental principles may be helpful in our effort to seek a meeting of minds in regard to the essential questions on which we seek agreement and thus lay a firm foundation for a meeting between the responsible heads of the two Governments. The subject of the meeting proposed by the Prime Minister and the objectives sought have engaged, and continue to engage, the close and active interest of the President of the United States, and it is the President's earnest hope that discussion of the fundamental questions may be so developed that such a meeting can be held. It is also the President's hope that the Japanese Government shares the conviction of this Government that, if the Governments of Japan and of the United States are resolved to give those principles practical and comprehensive application, the two Governments can work out a fundamental rehabilitation of the relations between the United States and Japan and contribute to the bringing about of a lasting peace with justice, equity and order in the whole Pacific area."

(Foreign Relations, Vol. II,
p. 655-661)

- - - - -

FILE COPY

Doc 2215, Exhibit J
RETURN TO ROOM 361

證據書類「J」

「ジョセフ・ダブリュー・バランタイン」一九四六年（昭和二十一年）六月二十四日附口供書

「一九四一年（昭和十六年）十月二日國務長官ヨリ日本大使（野村）ニ手交セラシタル口頭覺書」「ワシントン」、一九四一年十月二日

一九四一年（昭和十六年）九月六日、日本國大使が國務長官ニ通達セラレタル日本國政府ノ提案及右ニ關シ其ノ後日本國政府ノ當政府ニ通達セラレタル聲明書ニ付言及ス。

合衆國政府ハ右通牒（復數）ニ對シ慎重ナル檢討ヲ行ヒ且右檢討ニ關聯シ同一問題ニ付之ヨリ先キ日本國政府ノ提出セラレタル他ノ通牒ニ付テモ慎重ナル再檢討ヲ加ヘタリ、右檢討ニ基キ次ノ如キ所言ヲ爲サントス。

合衆國政府ハ八月上旬當地ニ於テ日本國大使ヲ通ジ合衆國及日本國間國交調整ヲ實現スル手段ヲ協議セシムルガ爲メ日本國政府及合衆國政府ノ責任アル首腦者ノ會合ヲ開催センコト及太平洋ノ全局ニ亘ル平和的解決ニ關スル交渉ノ基礎アリヤ否ヤヲ確カメンガ爲メニ兩國間ニ進行中ナリシ非公式會談ヲ再開セントシ日本國政府ノ提議ハ平和ノ「プログラム」ノ高遠ナル目的及原則ヲ促進シ得ル機會ヲ提供スルモノトシ

Ex 12456

2.

Doc 2215, Exhibit J

テ之ヲ歡迎ス。

從ツテ、一九四一年（昭和十六年）八月十七日大統領ヨリ日本大使ニ爲サレタル回答ニ於テ斯カル非公式會談ハ平和的手段ニ依リ達成シ得ベキ進歩的「プログラム」ノ立案ヲ當然豫見スベキモノナル旨、斯カル「プログラム」ハ通商上ノ機會及待遇ノ均等原則ヲ太平洋全地域ニ適用シ以テ一切ノ國家ニ依ル原料品及其他一切ノ必需物資ノ獲得ヲ可能ナラシムベキ旨ノ見解ガ披瀝セラレ且斯カル「プログラム」ノ採擇ガ日本國ヲ含ム一切ノ國家ニ齎スベキ利益ニツキ敘述セラレタリ、要スルニ若シ日本國政府ガ合衆國ノ遵守シ居ル「プログラム」及原則ノ「ライン」ニ沿ヒテ太平洋ニ臨スル平和的「プログラム」ニ著手シ得ルニ於テハ當政府ハ非公式豫備會談ノ再開ヲ考慮スルノ用意アルベキ旨竝ニ意見交換ノ爲適當ナル時期及場所ノ打合ニ欣然努力スベキ旨言明セラレタリ。

當政府ノ抱懷スル廣汎ナル目圖及根本原則ニ照ラシ合衆國國民及政府ガ堅持スル根本原則ニ合致スル平和方針ヲ遂行セントスル日本國ノ希望及意圖ヲ表明セル一九四一年（昭和十六年）八月二十八日ノ日本國首相ノ「メッセーヂ」及日本國政府ノ聲明書ヲ接受セルハ合衆國大統領及政府ノ大イニ欣幸トセル所ナリ、日本國政府ハ其ノ聲明書ニ於テ近接諸國ニ對

Doc 2215, Exhibit J

3.

シ挑發ナクシテ武力ヲ用フル意圖ヲ有セズトノ總括
的保障ヲ含ム廣汎ナル平和的意圖ノ保障ヲ或種ノ制
限附ニテ與ヘタリ、又日本國政府ハ大統領ノ略述セ
ル「プログラム」及原則ガ單ニ太平洋地域ニ適用セ
ラルルノミナラズ全世界ニ對スル「プログラム」ト
シテ之ヲ支持スル旨言明セリ。

合衆國政府ハ兩國首腦者會見ノ打合ニ關スル考慮ヲ
出來得ル限り速カニ行ハンコトヲ欲スルト共ニ右會
見ガ所期目的ノ達成確保ノ爲特定原則（複數）ノ解
釋及太平洋地域ニ於ケル具體的問題（複數）ニ對ス
ル之ガ適用ヲ明白ナラシムルヲ可ト認ム、細目ノ討
議ハ當政府ノ意圖ニハ非ザリキ、然レ共當政府ハ所
要ノ説明（クラリフィケーション）ハ意見ノ合致ニ
到達セントスル吾人ノ努力ヲ促進スル一方法タルベ
キヲ感ジタリ。

一九四一年（昭和十六年）九月三日、大統領ハ日本
國大使ヘノ回答ノ際日本國政府ノ言及セル諸原則ヲ
實際的ニ有効ナラシムル努力ニ合衆國政府ハ衷心ヨ
リ協力セントスル希望ヲ表明シタリ、大統領ハ當政
府ガ國家間ノ關係ノ基礎ト目シ居ル四原則ヲ反覆敘
述セリ。

該原則ハ左ノ如シ

一 一切ノ國家ノ領土保全及主權ノ尊重

二 他國ノ國內問題ニ對スル不干與ノ原則ノ支持

4.

Doc 2215, Exhibit J

三 通商上ノ機會均等ヲ含ム均等原則ノ支持
四 平和的手段ニ依リ現狀ガ變更セラルル場合ヲ除キ
太平洋ニ於ケル現狀ノ不穩亂

大統領ハ太平洋問題ノ満足ナル解決ヲ招來センガ爲
ニハ非公式會談中兩國政府間ニ根本的意見ノ相違ヲ
生ジタル諸點ニ關シ共通ノ見解及明確ナル合意ニ到
達スルノ緊要ナルコトヲ指摘セリ、而シテ大統領ハ
之等ノ根本問題ニ關スル日本國政府現在ノ態度ノ表
示ヲ要請セリ。

九月六日、日本國首相ハ在東京米國大使トノ會談ニ
於テ上述四原則ニ全面的ニ賛同スル旨言明セリ
上述ノ推移及保障ハ日本國政府ノ爲セル他ノ諸聲明
ト共ニ日本國政府ガ全太平洋地域ニ亘ル廣汎、進歩
的ナル「プログラム」ニ同調シ且之ヲ實行スルモノ
ト當政府ガ結論スルヲ正當タラシムルガ如シ、因テ
日本國政府ガ明カニ討議ノ具體的基礎タルベキモノ
ト意圖シタル一九四一年（昭和十六年）九月六日、
日本國大使ニ依リ提示セラレタル日本國政府ノ諸提
案ガ兩國政府ノ見解ニ阻礙アルコトヲ明カニスルモ
ノノ如ク思ハレシハ合衆國政府ニトリ失望ノ原因ナ
リキ、即チ當政府ノ意見ニ依レバ右諸提案及之ニ關
シテ爲サントタル其後ノ説明的諸聲明ハ既述ノ兩國間
非公式會談ノ基礎タリシ諸原則ノ適用ノミナラズ全
太平洋地域ニ於ケル平和及安定ノ確立及保持ヲ目的

5.

Doc 2215, Exhibit J

トスル廣汎ナル「プログラム」ヲ實施シ以テ合衆國
ト同調セントスル日本國政府ノ希望ニ對シ日本國政
府ガ與ヘシル諸種ノ保障ヲモ積少制限スルモノナリ
前述ノ通り日本國首相及日本國政府ガ與ヘタル各種
廣汎ナル保障ハ極メテ満足ナルモノナリ（然レ共）
日本國政府ハ他國家ニ對スル其ノ平和的意圖ニ關ス
ル態度ヲ表明スルニ當リ其ノ必要ガ容易ニ了解セラ
レザル如キ或種ノ辭句ヲ以テ其ノ保障ヲ制限セリ。
現在ノ事態ニ於テ佛領印度支那ノ隣接諸領域「タイ
國若クハ「ソヴェット」聯邦内ニ於テ日本國ニ對ス
ル何等カノ攻撃的脅威若クハ挑發ガ發展シツツアリ
ト想像スルコトハ困難ナリ。寧フ可カラザル自衛ノ
權利ハ勿論一切ノ國家ニ依リ充分認めラレ得ルヲ以
テ日本國政府ガ平和的意圖ニ關スル其ノ保障ヲ不必
要ナル制限的辭句ト思ハル所ヲ以テ制限セラルル
ハ果シテ何ヲ意圖セラルルモノナリヤト疑問ヲ懷ク
モノモアリ得ベシ。

非公式會談ニ於テ太平洋地域ニ於ケル日本國及米國
ノ活動ハ平和的手段ニ依リ且國際通商關係ニ於ケル
無差別ノ原則ニ準據シテ行ハルベキコトヲ規定スル
經濟政策ニ關スル一方式（了解案第五章）ニ關シ暫
定的合意ニ到達セリ。右方式ニ含まレタル誓約ハ九
月六日附日本國政府ノ諸提案及其後ノ日本國政府ヨ
リノ通報ニ於テ南西太平洋地域（太平洋地域全体ニ

Doc 2215, Exhibit J

6.

アラス)ノ諸國ニ局限セラレタリ、中國ニ關シ日本
國政府ハ無差別ノ原則ヲ尊重スベキ旨ヲ述ベタルガ
此ノ點ニ關聯シ爲サレタル説明ハ日本國政府ガ中國
ニ對スル地理的近接ノ理由ニ基キ此原則ノ適用ニ對
シ或ル制限ヲ意圖シ居ルコトヲ暗示シ居ルヤニ思ハ
レル。

若シ合衆國若クハ日本國ノ何レカガ或ル地域ニ於テ
ハ一ノ針路又ハ政策ニ從フニ拘ラズ同時ニ他ノ地域
ニ於テハ之ト反對ノ針路又ハ政策ニ從フニ於テハ日
本國政府又ハ當政府ノ確言セル目的ニ背スルコトナ
カルベキハ明カナリ。

「當政府ハ不確定期間中國特定ノ地域ニ軍隊ヲ駐屯
セシメントスル要望ヲ支持スルタメノ日本國政府ノ
見解ヲ着目ス。斯カル提議ニ關スル理由(複數)ノ
間題ハ全然之ヲ損キ日本國ガ中國ニ於テ廣大ナル地
域ヲ軍事的ニ占領シ居ル秋ニ於テ日華間ノ平和的解
決ニ付提議セララルル條件中ニ斯クノ如キ規定ヲ包含
セシムルハ異議ノ餘地アリ。例之他國ノ領土ヲ軍事
的ニ占領スル一國ガ平和的解決及他ノ地域ヨリノ占
領軍撤退ノタメノ條件トシテ相手國ノ特定地域ニ於
ケル自國軍隊ノ駐屯繼續方ヲ相手國へ提議ストセバ
右ハ非公式會談ニ於テ討議セラレタル進歩的且漸化
的針路及原則ト合致セザルモノト認メラレ而シテ當
政府ノ見解ニ依レバ斯カル方法ハ平和ヲ招來シ又ハ

7.

Doc 2215, Exhibit J

安定ノ期待ヲ提供スルコトナカルベシ。
日本軍隊ノ中國及佛領印度支那撤退ニ臨スル日本國ノ意圖ヲ明確ニ宣言アルハ日本國ノ平和的意圖及太平洋地域ニ於ケル將來ノ安定及進歩ノタメ健全ナル基礎ヲ確立スルニトシ目的トスル針路ニ從ハントスル日本國ノ希望ヲ知ラシムルニ極メテ有効ナルベク右ハ批評的ニ傾カントスル人々ニ對シ特ニ然ルベシト信ズ

歐洲戰爭ニ對スル（日米）各國ノ態度ニ關シ當政府ハ兩國關係ノ各方面ニ附屬スル困難ニ對處スル爲更ニ日本國政府が執ラレタル措置ヲ多トス。日本國政府ガ若シ其ノ立場ヲ此ノ上闡明シ得ルヤ否ヤニ付更ニ御檢討ヲ加ヘラルルニ於テハ有念ナルベシト信ズ

提案セラレタル政府責任首腦者ノ會見實現ノ素地ヲ準備センガ爲根本的問題ニ關シ原則上ノ合意ニ到達セントシテ兩國政府間ニ行ハレタル意見交換ニ際シ當政府ハ其ノ期スル所ハ自由且進歩の原則ノ全太平洋地域ヘノ均等ナル適用ヲ要求スルガ如キ廣汎ナル「プログラム」ナルコトヲ明カニセント努力セリ。

當政府ハ日本國政府ガ其目的ニ關シ今日迄表示セラレタル所ニ徴シ、日本國政府ハ之等原則ノ實際ノ適用ニ對シ制限及例外ヲ設クルコトニ依リ局限セラレルガ如キ「プログラム」ヲ考慮シ居ラルルヤノ印象ヲ得タリ。

若シ此ノ印象ニ誤リナシトセバ日本國政府ハ斯カル事情ノ下ニ於ケル政府責任首腦者ノ會見ハ兩國ガ相互ニ考慮シ居ルガ如キ高遠ナル目的ノ増進ニ寄與スベシト思惟セラルルヤ。

既報ノ如ク、當政府ハ日本國首相ノ合衆國大統領宛「メッセーヂ」ニ伴ヒシ日本國政府ノ聲明書ニ包含セラレ居ル保障即チ日本國政府ハ當政府ガ安定セル國際關係ノ爲ニスル唯一ノ健全ナル基礎トシテ久シキニ亘リ提唱シ來レル諸原則ニ贊同スル旨ノ保障ヲ歡迎セリ。當政府ハ之等根本的諸原則ヲ更メテ考慮スルハ吾人が合意ヲ得ント企及シ居ル根本的諸問題ニ關スル意思ノ合致ヲ求メ且斯クシテ兩國政府責任首腦者ノ會見ニ對スル確固タル基礎ヲ供與セントスル吾人ノ努力ニ裨益スベキコトヲ信ズ、日本國首相ノ提議セラレタル會見ノ問題及希求セラルル目的ハ合衆國大統領ノ綿密且積極的關心ヲ惹キ來リ又現ニ惹キツツアリ。斯カル會見ガ行ハレ得ル様根本的諸問題ニ付テノ討議ガ進展セラルベキコトハ大統領ノ眞摯ナル希望ナリ。日本國及合衆國政府ガ右諸原則ニ實際的且包括的ナル適用ヲ加ヘンコトヲ決意スルニ於テハ兩國政府ハ合衆國及日本國間ニ於ケル關係ノ根本的恢復ヲ成就シ得且全太平洋地域ニ於ケル正義、衡平及秩序ヲ伴フ永續的平和ノ招來ニ貢獻シ得ベシトノ當政府ノ信念ヲ日本國政府ニ於カレテモ均

Doc 2215, Exhibit J

9.

シク抱懷セラレ居ルコトハ又大統領ノ希望ナリ。
(外交關係、第二卷第六五六―六六一頁)

EXHIBIT "K" - Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine, 24 June 1946.

"Draft Proposal Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on November 20, 1941.

"1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the South-eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo-China where the Japanese troops are stationed at present.

"2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area.

"In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present arrangement which shall later be embodied in the final agreement.

"3. The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies.

"4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets.

"The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of oil.

"5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China." (Foreign Relations, Vol. II, p. 755-756)

- - - - -

Exhibit "K"

Doc 2215, Exhibit K.

證據卷類「K」―「ジョセフ・ダブリュー
バランタイン」ノ一九四六年六月二十四日
附口供書

一九四一年ノ昭和十六年ノ十一月二十日
日本大使（野村ヨリ）閣務長官ニ手交セラレタル
提案ノ草案

一 日米兩國政府ハ孰モ目下日本軍ノ駐在スル佛領
印度支那一部ヲ除ク、南東亞細亞及南太平洋地
域ニ武力的進出ヲ行ハザルコトヲ確約ス。

二 日本國政府ハ日華間ノ平和恢復スルカ、又ハ太
平洋地域ニ於ケル公正ナル平和確立スル上ハ現
ニ佛領印度支那ニ駐屯中ノ日本軍隊ヲ撤退スベ
キ旨ヲ確約ス、ソノ間ニ日本國政府ハ本取極成
立セバ現ニ南滿佛領印度支那ニ駐屯中日本軍ハ
之ヲ北部佛領印度支那ニ移駐スルノ用意アルコ
トヲ聲明ス。而シテ本取極ハ後日最終的了結ニ
包含セラレルモノトス。

三 日米兩國政府ハ南滿及印度ニ於テ其ノ必要トス
ル物資ノ獲得ガ保障セラル、様相互ニ協力スル
モノトス。

四 日米兩國政府ハ相互ニ通商關係ヲ容産凍結前ノ

Doc 2215, Exhibit K

状態ニ復歸スベク確約ス。

米國政府ハ所望ノ石油ノ對日供給ヲ爲スベシ。

米國政府ハ日華兩國間ノ全面的和平回復ニ關スル努力ニ支障ヲ與フルガ如キ措置及行動ニ出デザルベシ。

(外交關係第二卷第七五五―七五六頁)

2.

Q. #1245 I

EXHIBIT "L" - Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine, 24 June 1946

"Oral Statement Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on November 26, 1941.

"Washington, November 26, 1941.

"The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

"It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purposes above indicated.

"The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out of a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned.

"With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations.

"The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our draft of June 21, 1941 and the Japanese draft of September 25 by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited."

- - - - -

"Document Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on November 26, 1941.

"Strictly Confidential
Tentative and Without
Commitment.

Washington, November 26, 1941

"Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and Japan.

"Section I

"Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy

"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in the national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:

- "(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
- (2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
- (3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.
- (4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

"The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

"(1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

(2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.

(3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.

(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.

(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

"Section II

"Steps To Be Taken By the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan.

"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

"1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

"2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.

"(3) The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina.

"4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support--militarily, politically, economically--any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

"5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

"Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

"6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

"7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

"8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

"9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

"10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement." (Foreign Relations, Vol. II, p. 766-770)

- - - - -

Doc 2215, Exhibit L

1.

證據書類「L」「ジョセフ・ダアルニー・ベランタイ
ン」ノ一九四六年（昭和二十一年）六月二十四日附口供書

一九四一年（昭和十六年）十一月二十六日國務長
官ヨリ日本大使（野村）ニ手交セラレシ口頭聲明書

ワシントン、一九四一年（昭和十六年）十一月二
十六日合衆國政府及日本國政府代表ハ數ヶ月ニ亙リ
諸國間ノ平和、安寧秩序並ニ公正ナル處理ノ諸原則
ニ基キ太平洋全地域ニ關スル諸問題ニ付出來得レバ
解決ニ到達センガ爲メ非公式檢討的會談ヲ繼續シ來
レリ。之等諸原則ハ一切ノ國家ノ領土保全及主權不
可侵ノ原則、他國ノ國內問題ニ對スル不干與ノ原則、
通商上ノ機會及待遇ノ平等ヲ含ム平等原則、紛争ノ
防止及平和的解決並ニ平和的方法及手續ニ依ル國際
情勢改善ノ爲メ國際協力及國際調停進據ノ原則ヲ含
ムモノトス。

右討議ニ於テ太平洋全地域ニ亙ル平和的解決ノ基礎
タルベキ一般的諸原則ニ關シテハ若干ノ進展ヲ見タ
ルモノト信ゼラル。最近日本國大使ハ日本國政府ニ
於テ太平洋地域ニ於ケル包括的且平和的解決ヲ目的
トスル會談ノ繼續ヲ希望スル旨及ビ若シ太平洋ニ於
ケル平和的解決ヲ目的トスル會談繼續中有效ナルベ
キ暫定的取極ガ合意セラルルニ於テハ同會談ノ妥結

1245 I

2.

Doc 2215, Exhibit L

ニ好都合ナル勢國氣ノ顯威ヲ助長スベキ旨陳述セラレタリ、十一月二十日日本國大使ハ國務長官ニ對シ日本國政府及合衆國政府ニ依リ夫々採擇セラルベキ質定的措置ニ關スル提案ヲ通告セラレタル處右措置ハ前記諸目的達成ヲ企圖セラレタルモノト了解セラル、合衆國政府ハ太平洋地域ニ於ケル平和及安定ノ促進及維持ニ寄與シ且太平洋地域全般ノ平和ニ關スル廣汎ナル「プログラム」立案ヲ目的トスル日本國政府トノ會談ヲ繼續スル爲メ凡ユル機會ヲ供與センコトヲ最モ眞摯ニ希望シ居ルモノナリ、十一月二十日日本國大使ニ依リ提出セラレタル提案(複數)ハ當政府ノ見解ニ依レバ目下考慮セラレ居ル一般の解決ノ一部ヲ成シ且各政府ガ遵奉スル旨言明シタル基本原則ト矛盾スル若干ノ點ヲ包含シ居レリ。合衆國政府ハ新ル提案(複數)ノ採擇ハ太平洋地域ニ於ケル安寧秩序及正義ニ基ツケル平和確保ノ究極目的ニ寄與シ得ザルベシト信ジ且既述ノ基本原則ノ實際的適用ニ關スル兩國見解ノ相違ヲ解決スル爲メ更ニ努力セラルベキ旨提議スルモノナリ。

右ノ目的ヲ以テ合衆國政府ハ同國政府ガ兩國今後ノ會談ノ際立案セラルベキモノト豫見スル「プログラム」ノ實際的例證トシテ太平洋全地域ニ亘ル廣汎作ラ簡單ナル解決ノ一案ヲ提出シ日本國政府ノ考慮ニ

Doc 2215, Exhibit 1

供スルモノナリ

右ニ提議セル案ハ包括的ナル太平洋地區解決ノ基礎
的主要問題ヲ具メテ案議スルコトニ依リ一九四一年
(昭和十六年)六月二十一日附米國案及九月二十五
日附日本案ノ隔隔ヲ調整セントノ努力ヲ示スモノナ
リ。本案ハ吾人ノ會談ニ於テ良好ナル國際關係ノ確
一旦健全ナル基礎ヲ爲スモノト意見一致セル基本原
則ノ實際的適用ニ關スル諸規定ヲ含ムモノナリ。吾
人ハ斯クスルコトニヨリ日米兩國政府間ノ意思ノ合
致ニ導ク進展ヲ促進シ得ベキモノト期待ス

。。。。。。。。

一九四一年(昭和十六年)十一月二十六日、國務
長官ヨリ日本大使(野村)ニ手交セラレタル書類

嚴秘試驗的、非拘束的、

ワシントン、一九四一年(昭和十六年)十一月二
十六日、日米間協定ノ提議基礎ノ概要
第一項

兩國宣言案

米國政府及日本國政府ハ太平洋ノ平和ヲ熱望シ、
其ノ政策ハ太平洋全般ノ恒久的平和ニ向ケラレ領土
的企圖ナク他國ヲ脅威スルノ意ナク又隣國ニ對シ攻
勢的ニ兵力ヲ用フルノ意ナキコトヲ宣言シ、隨ツテ
兩政府ノ國家政策ニ於テ、其ノ相互關係及ヒ他ノ凡

2.

Doc 2215, Exhibit L

ニル政府トノ關係ノ基礎タル次ノ根本原則ヲ積極的ニ支持シ、實際的適用ヲナスベキコトヲ確言ス。

(一) 一切ノ國家ノ領土保全及主權不可侵ノ原則、

(二) 他國ノ國內問題ニ干渉スル不干與ノ原則、

(三) 商業上ノ機會及待遇ノ均等ヲ含ム均等ノ原則、

(四) 紛争ノ豫防及平和的解決並ニ平和的方法及手續ニ依ル國際情勢改善ノ爲メ國際協力及和解ニ依ルノ原則、

日本國政府及合衆國政府ハ、慢性的政局不安定ヲ除去シ、繰返サル經濟ノ破滅ヲ防止シ而シテ平和ノ基礎ヲ作ランガ爲メ次ノ諸原則ヲ相互及他國トノ經濟關係ニ於テ之ヲ積極的ニ支持シ、實際的ニ適用スルニ合意セリ

(一) 國際通商關係ニ於ケル無差別ノ原則、

(二) 國際的經濟協力ノ原則、並ニ極端ナル貿易制限ノ如キ極端ナル國家主義ノ拋棄ノ原則、

(三) 各國ガ原料供給ノ無差別の均等ヲ受ケ得ルノ原則、

(四) 國際的物資協定ノ運用ニ關シ、消費國家及ビ住民ノ利益ノ充分ナル保護ノ原則、

(五) 各國家ノ主要事業及ビ繼續的發展ニ助力ヲ與シ且一切ノ國家ノ福祉ト一致スル貿易ノ過程ヲ通シテ支拂ヲ許容シ得ルガ如キ國際金融ノ機關及取極ノ設定ノ原則、

第二項

4.

Doc 2215, Exhibit L

5.

合衆國政府及日本國政府ニ依ツテ執ラルベキ措置。

合衆國政府及日本政府ハ、次ノ措置ヲ執ルコトヲ提議ス

一、合衆國政府及日本國政府ハ、英帝國、中華民國、日本、和蘭、蘇聯邦、泰國及合衆國間ニ多邊的不侵略協定ヲ締結スルニ努力ス。

二、兩國政府ハ、米、英、中華民國、日本、和蘭及泰國政府間ニ各政府ガ佛領印度支那ノ領土保全ヲ尊重シ、佛領印度支那ノ領土保全ニ脅威ヲ齎スベキ事態發生セバ、同脅威ニ對處スベク必要ニシテ適當ナリト認メラル、措置ヲ執ル爲メ直チニ協議ヲ開始スル事ヲ約束スル協定ノ締結ニ努力ス、該協定ハ、亦協定參加國ノ各政府ガ對印度支那貿易或ヒハ經濟的關係ニ於テ特惠待遇ヲ希求若シクハ受諾セザル旨及對佛印度貿易並ニ通商ニ於テ、締盟各國ガ待遇均等ヲ獲得シ得ベク盡カスル旨規定スルモノトス。

三、日本國政府ハ、中華民國及佛印ヨリ全陸海軍及警察力ヲ撤退ス。

四、合衆國政府及日本政府ハ、重慶ニ臨時首都ヲ置ク中華民國國民政府以外ノ中華民國ニ於ケル如何ナル政府若シクハ政權ヲモ、軍事的、政治的、經濟的ニ支持セズ。

五、兩國政府ハ、共同租界及ビ居留地ニ於ケル權

Doc 2215, Exhibit L

益並ニ、一九〇一年（明治三十四年）ノ國匪事件議
定書ニ基ク權利ヲ含ム、中華民國ニ於ケル一切ノ治
外法權ヲ拋棄ス、兩國政府ハ、共同租界及居留地ニ
於ケル權益並ニ一九〇一年ノ國匪事件議定書ニ基ク
權利ヲ含ム中華民國ニ於ケル治外法權ノ放棄ニ、英
國其ノ他ノ政府ノ同意ヲ待ベク努力ス。

六、合衆國政府及日本國政府ハ、兩國ニ依ル互惠
最惠國待遇及貿易障礙ノ輕減ニ基ツク米日間通商協
定締結ノ交渉ヲ開始ス。

右協定ニハ米國ガ生糸ヲ免稅品目（フリー・リスト）
中ニ入ルルコトノ約束ヲ含ムモノトス。

七、合衆國政府及日本政府ハ、夫々合衆國ニ於ケ
ル日本資産及、日本ニ於ケル亞米利加資産ノ凍結令
ヲ解除ス。

八、兩國政府ハ弗圖比率安定ノ計畫ニ同意シ、夫
ニ必要ナル資金ハ日米各々、半分宛出資ス。

九、兩國政府ハ、何レモ第三國タル一國若ハ諸國
ト締結シタル協定ハ本協定ノ基本即意圖タル太平洋
地域ヲ通ジテノ平和ノ確立及維持ト衝突スルガ如ク
解釋サルルコトナキニ同意ス。

一〇、兩國政府ハ、他ノ政府ヲシテ本協定ノ基本
的政治上及經濟上ノ諸原則ニ同意シ、之ヲ實際ニ適
用セシメルガ如ク勸誘スベシ。

（外交關係第二卷第七六六―七七〇頁）

EXHIBIT "M" - Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine. 24 June 1946.

"President Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito of Japan"

"[Washington,] December 6, 1941

"Almost a century ago the President of the United States addressed to the Emperor of Japan a message extending an offer of friendship of the people of the United States to the people of Japan. That offer was accepted, and in the long period of unbroken peace and friendship which has followed, our respective nations, through the virtues of their peoples and the wisdom of their rulers have prospered and have substantially helped humanity.

"Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel I should now so address you because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation.

"Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between our two countries. Those developments contain tragic possibilities.

"The people of the United States, believing in peace and in the right of nations to live and let live, have eagerly watched the conversations between our two Governments during these past months. We have hoped for a termination of the present conflict between Japan and China. We have hoped that a peace of the Pacific could be consummated in such a way that nationalities of many diverse peoples could exist side by side without fear of invasion; that unbearable burdens of armaments could be lifted for them all; and that all peoples would resume commerce without discrimination against or in favor of any nation.

"I am certain that it will be clear to Your Majesty, as it is to me, that in seeking these great objectives both Japan and the United States should agree to eliminate any form of military threat. This seemed essential to the attainment of the high objectives.

"More than a year ago Your Majesty's Government concluded an agreement with the Vichy Government by which five or six thousand Japanese troops were permitted to enter into Northern French Indo-China for the protection of Japanese troops which were operating against China further north. And this Spring and Summer the Vichy Government permitted further Japanese military forces to enter into Southern French Indo-China for the common defense of French Indo-China. I think I am correct in saying that no attack has been made upon Indo-China, nor that any has been contemplated.

"During the past few weeks it has become clear to the world that Japanese military, naval and air forces have been sent to Southern Indo-China in such large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing concentration in Indo-China is not defensive in its character.

"Because these continuing concentrations in Indo-China have reached such large proportions and because they extend now to the southeast and the southwest corners of that Peninsula, it is only reasonable that the people of the Philippines, of the hundreds of Islands of the East Indies, of Malaya and of Thailand itself are asking themselves whether these forces of Japan are preparing or intending to make attack in one or more of these many directions.

"I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear of all these peoples is a legitimate fear in as much as it involves their peace

and their national existence. I am sure that Your Majesty will understand why the people of the United States in such large numbers look askance at the establishment of military, naval and air bases manned and equipped so greatly as to constitute armed forces capable of measures of offense.

"It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable.

"None of the peoples whom I have spoken of above can sit either indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite.

"There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be withdrawn therefrom.

"I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the Governments of the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya and the Government of Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the part of the Government of China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo-China would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area.

"I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to ways of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only of our own great countries but for the sake of humanity in neighboring territories, have a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT"

(Foreign Relations, Vol. II, p. 784-786)

Ex 1245-J
Doc 2215, Exhibit M

證據書類「M」「シヨセフダヴリエー、ベラシタイン」、
一九四六年（昭和二十一年）六月二十四日附口供書

「ルースヴェルト」大統領ヨリ日本國天皇陛下宛

「ワシントン」ニ於テ一九四二年（昭和十六年）十二
月六日、

約一世紀前米國大統領ハ日本國天皇ニ對シ誓ヲ
致シ米國民ノ日本國々民ニ對スル友交ヲ申出タル
處右ハ受諾セラレ、爾來不斷ノ平和ト友好ノ長期
間ニ亘リ兩國ハ其ノ徳ト指導者ノ睿智ニヨリテ繁
榮シ人類ニ對シ偉大ナル貢獻ヲ爲セリ。

陛下ニ對シ余ガ國務ニ關シ親書ヲ呈スルハ兩國
ニ取り特ニ重大ナル場合ニ於テノミナルガ、現ニ
釐成セラレツ、アルト思ハレル深刻且廣汎ナル非
常事態ニ鑑ミ茲ニハ一書ヲ呈スベキモノト感ズル
次第ナリ。

日米兩國民及全人類ヲシテ兩國間ノ長年ニ亘ル
平和ノ福祉ヲ喪失セシメントスルガ如キ事態ガ現
ニ太平洋地域ニ發生シツ、アリ右情勢ハ悲劇ノ可
能性ヲ孕ムモノナリ。

米國民ハ平和ト諸國家ノ共存ノ權利トラ信シ過
去數ヶ月ニ亘ル日米交渉ヲ熱心ニ注視シ來レリ。
吾人ハ現在ノ日華事變ノ終熄ヲ祈念シ諸國民ニ於

1.

Doc 2215, Exhibit M

2.

テ侵略ノ恐怖ナクシテ共存シ得ルガ如キ太平洋平和ガ實現セラレンコトヲ希望シ且堪ヘ難キ軍備ノ負擔ヲ除去シ又各國民ガ如何ナル國家ヲモ排撃シ若クハ之ニ特惠ヲ與フルガ如キ差別ヲ設ケザル通商ヲ復活センコトヲ念願セリ。

右大目的ヲ達成センガ爲ニハ陛下ニ於カレテモ余ト同シク日米兩國ハ如何ナル形式ノ軍事脅威ヲモ除去スルコトニ同意スベキコト明瞭ナリト信ズ。此ノ事ハ高キ目標達成ノタメニ不可缺ノコトデアルト考ヘラレル。

一年有餘前陛下ノ政府ハ「ヴァイシー」政府ト協定ヲ締結シ之ニ基キ北部佛領印度支那ニ、同地北方ニ於テ支那ニ對シ行動シ居リタル日本軍保護ノ爲ニ五、六千ノ軍隊ヲ進駐セシメタリ。而シテ本年春及夏「ヴァイシー」政府ハ佛領印度支那共同防衛ノ爲メ更ニ日本部隊ノ南部佛印進駐ヲ許容セリ余ハ佛領印度支那ニ對シ何等ノ攻撃行ハレタルコトナク又攻撃ヲ企圖セラレタルコトナシト言明シテ蓋支ナシト思考ス。

最近數週間日本陸海空軍部隊ハ夥シク南部佛領印度支那ニ增強セラレタルコト明白トナリタル爲他國ニ對シ此ノ印度支那ニ於ケル集結ノ繼續ハ其ノ性質上防禦的ニ非ストノ尤モナル疑惑ヲ生ゼシ

Doc 2215, Exhibit M

ムルニ至レリ。

右印度支那ニ於ケル繼續的集結ハ極メテ大規模ニ行ハレ又右ハ今ヤ同半島ノ南東及南西端ニ達シタルヲ以テ比島、東印度ノ數百ノ島嶼、馬來及泰國ノ住民ハ日本軍ガ之等地方ノ何レカニ對シ攻撃ヲ準備乃至企圖シ居ルニ非ズヤト猜疑シツ、アルハ蓋シ當然ナリ。

之等住民ノ總テガ抱懷スル恐怖ハ其ノ平和及國民的存立ニ關スルモノナルガ故ニ斯ル恐怖ハ當然ナルコトニ於カレテモ御諒解アラセラル、所ナリト信ズ。余ハ攻撃措置ヲ執リ得ル兵力ヲ成ス程度ニ人員ト裝備ヲ爲セル陸、海及空軍基地ノ設置ニ對シ米國民ノ多クガ何故ニ猜疑ノ眼ヲ向クルカハ陛下ニ於カセラレテハ御諒解相成ルベシト思惟ス。

新ル事態ノ繼續ハ到底考ヘラレザル所ナルコト明カナリ。余ガ前述シタル諸國民ハ何レモ無限ニ若クハ恒久ニ「ダイナマイト」爆ノ上ニ坐シ得ルモノニ非ズ。

若シ日本ノ陸海兵ガ全面的ニ印度支那ヨリ撤去スルニ於テハ合衆國ハ同地ニ侵入スルノ意圖毫モナシ。

余ハ東印度諸政府、馬來諸政府及泰國政府ヨリ同様ノ保障ヲ求メ得ルモノト思考シ且支那政府ニ

3.

Doc 2215, Exhibit M

對シテスラ同様保障ヲ求ムル用意アリ。斯クシテ
日本軍ノ節印ヨリノ撤去ハ全南太平洋地域ニ於ケ
ル平和ノ保障ヲ招來スベシ。

余ガ陛下ニ書ヲ致スハ此ノ明確ナル危局ニ際シ
陛下ニ於カレデモ余ト同様ニ暗雲ヲ一掃スルノ方
法ニ關シ孝慮セウレシコトラ希望スルガ爲ナリ。
余ハ陛下ト共ニ日米兩大國々民ノミナラス隣接諸
國ノ住民ノ爲兩國民間ノ傳統的友誼ヲ恢復シ世界
ニ於ケル此ノ上ノ死滅トラ防止スルノ神聖ナル責
務ヲ有スルコトラ確信スルモノナリ。

「フランクリン・デイ・ルーズヴェルト」

(外交關係第二卷、第七八四—七八六頁)

EXHIBIT "N" - Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine, 24 June 1946

"Memorandum Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State at 2:20 P.M. on December 7, 1941.

"1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific Area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific Area.

"The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

"2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace and thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world.

"Ever since China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy.

"However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia. Exerting pressure on the Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defence of French Indo-China, both American and British Governments, wilfully misinterpreting it as a threat to their own possessions, and inducing the Netherlands Government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the Empire.

"Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, the American Government, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental and essential questions.

EXHIBIT "N" - Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine, 24 June 1946
- cont'd -

"3. Subsequently, on September 25th the Japanese Government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American Government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American Government, adhering steadfastly to its original assertions, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

"Therefore, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

"(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with the view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific Area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

"As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as 'introducer' of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

Exhibit "N" - cont'd

Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine, 24 June 1946

"The American Government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as so-called 'introducer' of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese Government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American Government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

"4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties. As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude. As for the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific Area including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis. Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese Government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

"It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American Government.

"On the other hand, the American Government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delay in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American Government and the Japanese Government desires to call the attention of the American Government especially to the following points:

"1. The American Government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese Government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

Exhibit "N" - cont'd.

Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballentine, 24 June 1946

"Of the various principles put forward by the American Government as a basis of the Japanese-American Agreement, there are some which the Japanese Government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a utopian ideal on the part of the American Government to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

"Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

"2. The American proposal contained a stipulation which states--'Both Governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third power or powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area'. It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the War in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

"The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific Area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy, two Powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific Area through peaceful means.

"3. Whereas the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settle international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhumane than military pressure.

"4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in coalition with Great Britain and other Powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in

other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that the countries of East Asia for the past hundred years or more have been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice themselves to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

"The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. Thus the six countries,--Japan, the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, China and Thailand,--excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the Governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese Government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the Nine Power Treaty structure which is the chief factor responsible for the present predicament of East Asia.

"5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American Government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce ignored the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American Government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking Government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American Government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American Government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

"5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of yen and dollar exchange, or the abolition of extraterritorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the Empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

Exhibit "N" - cont'd
Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine, 24 June 1946

"6. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements to be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American Government. However, since the American Government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultation with Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and Chungking, and presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime in the questions of China, it must be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

"7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiation. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

"Washington, 7 December 7, 1941."

(Foreign Relations, Vol. II, p. 787-792.)

- - - -